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COMMENTS
THE LEGALITY OF CREDIT UNION SHARE DRAFT ACCOUNTS
UNDER FEDERAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Credit unions are cooperative thrift and lending institutions owned and
operated on a volunteer basis by individuals united by an occupational,
residential, or associational bond.' First established in the United States in
1909,2 these financial institutions were developed as self-help associations
whose members, by pooling their small savings together, could create a source
of credit from which they could borrow money. 3 Today, credit unions can be
formed under either a federal or state charter. 4 On the federal level, these
associations are chartered under the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934 (Act).s
Under that Act, federal credit unions are empowered to receive the savings
of their members for deposit into share accounts. 6 Traditionally, these savings
1. D. Harless, Nonbank Financial Institutions 69 (1975); see D. Melvin, R. Davis & G.
Fischer, Credit Unions and the Credit Union Industry: A Study of the Powers, Organization,
Regulation and Competition 7, 37 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Credit Union Study]. All members
of a credit union must be held together by a "common bond" of occupation. residence, or
association (e.g., a church or labor union). Of the three, the occupational form of membership
unity is the most prevalent. Id. at 110; Flannery, Credit Unions as Consumer Lenders in the
United States, New Eng. Econ. Rev., July/Aug. 1974, at 4-5.
2. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 11. The first known credit unions were established in
Germany in the nineteenth century. See notes 27-28 infra and accompanying text.
3. Recommended Order at 2, Leon County Teachers Credit Union Case, No. 76-2091 (Fla.
Div. of Admin. Hearings June 6, 1977); 105 Cong. Rec. 11968 (1959); Note, Credit Unions-
Regulatory Control De-velopment-Problenzs-Recoinnendatiots, 18 \'and. L. Rev. 205, 207-08
(1964); see D. Harless, Nonbank Financial Institutions 70 (1975). Of all the nonbank financial
institutions, credit unions achieved the highest average annual growth rate in assets-16. 1% per
year-between 1945 and 1973. Id. at 8. Despite this rapid growth rate, credit unions only control
approximately 4% of the total dollar volume of savings in depository financial instittitions. Credit
Union Study, supra note 1, at 179. They do, however, hold more than 1711 of total consumer
installment credit. Id. at 168.
4. D. Harless, Nonbank Financial Institutions 69 (1975). Under both chartering systems,
credit unions have experienced tremendous growth. In 1940, state credit unions numbered 5,267,
with a total membership of 1.7 million. By 1976, these institutions numbered 9,783, with 15
million members. During that same time period, the number of federal credit unions grew from
3,756 to 12,835, accompanied by an increase in total membership from 1.1 million to 18.6
million. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 114.
5. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1790 (1976), as amended by Federal Credit Union Act Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, §§ 301-310, 91 Stat. 49.
6. The Act provides that a credit union can "receive from its members . payments on
shares which may be issued at varying dividend rates . .. subject to such terms, rates, and
conditions as may be established by the board of directors, within limitations prescribed by the
Administrator." Federal Credit Union Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, § 303(a), 91
Stat. 51 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1757(7) (1976)). Share accounts are the most prevalent form of
credit union accounL While these accounts legally represent the holder's purchase of shares in the
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have been withdrawable by the member in person or by mail. 7 On December
8, 1977, however, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA),8 the
regulatory agency for all federally chartered credit unions, promulgated a final
rule regulating the offering of a new type of account by credit unions-the
share draft account.9 This account is a regular interest-bearing share ac-
count ° from which withdrawals are accomplished by means of negotiable or
nonnegotiable drafts drawn on the credit union payable to the account holder
or third persons. I The draft is presented to the credit union for payment by a
"payable through bank, ' '1 2 and is subject to the credit union's right to a notice
of withdrawal of sixty days or less. 13
As a result of their close resemblance to interest-bearing checking accounts,
which are prohibited by federal law,1 4 share draft accounts have been the
source of much controversy since their introduction in 1974. In that year, the
NCUA published a rule' s designed to facilitate the establishment by federal
credit unions of experimental programs like share drafts. Pursuant to this
credit union, they are largely comparable to a passbook or savings account at a bank or savings
and loan association. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 24. For a technical discussion of share
accounts, see notes 82-93 infra and accompanying text.
7. Iowa Credit Union League v. Iowa Dep't of Banking, CE 6-3152, slip op. at 5 (Iowa Dist.
Ct. May 24, 1977) discussed in pt. III(A) infra.
8. See 12 U.S.C. § 1752a (1976).
9. 42 Fed. Reg. 61977 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 701.34). This rule was originally
proposed on February 28, 1977. Id. at 11247.
10. Technically, as regular share accounts, share draft accounts earn dividends, not interest,
since share accounts confer certain ownership rights on the account holder. Credit Union Study,
supra note 1, at 24; see notes 84-88 infra and accompanying text. However, the dividends are
treated as interest by the Internal Revenue Service for the purpose of personal tax returns. Hence
the credit union member's share draft account "dividends" do not qualify for the $100 dividend
exclusion from gross income. I.R.C. §§ 116(b)(1), 501(c)(1). This Comment will hereafter refer to
the member's return on his share draft account as interest, and not as dividends.
11. 42 Fed. Reg. 61977, 61984 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 701.34(a)(4)). Under the
proposed regulation, the credit union member had to open a separate account on which he could
draw share drafts. Id. at 11247. The final rule modified this requirement by permitting members
to draw share drafts directly on their existing share account. Id. at 61979-80.
12. Id. at 61984 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 701.34(c)(5)(i)). A "payable through bank" is
the bank that the credit union has designated to present the share draft to the credit union for
payment. Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 701.34(a)(2)). The use of "payable through banks" is
necessary for the efficient maintenance of share draft accounts in that those banks permit share
drafts to be cleared through the same check clearing system used by banks. For a discussion of
the share draft clearing system, see notes 69-73 infra and accompanying text.
13. Unless otherwise approved by the NCUA Administrator, all federally chartered credit
unions must accept a set of standard bylaws prepared by the NCUA. 12 U.S.C. § 1758 (1976).
The standard form of bylaws provides that the board of directors has the right to require the
member to give notice of 60 days or less of an intention to withdraw funds from his account.
Standard Federal Credit Union Bylaws art. III, § 5(a).
14. See Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1978, at 1, col. 5; note; 220-21 infra and accompanying text.
See generally N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1978, at D1, col. 1.
15. 12 C.F.R. § 721.3 (1977). That rule invited all interested parties to submit pilot programs
on electronic funds transfer, loan programs, and other operational systems to the Administrator.
Id.
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rule, the first three credit union share draft programs were approved by the
Agency on October 1, 1974.16 Within two years the NCUA had similarly
approved experimental share draft programs for nearly four hundred addi-
tional federal credit unions.17 Prompted by this proliferation of pilot pro-
grams, the American Bankers Association filed suit on September 7, 1976, in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 8 against the
NCUA, challenging the power of federal credit unions to establish share draft
accounts under the Federal Credit Union Act. 19 The question raised by that
case was left unresolved, however, when the action was later dismissed
without prejudice to the plaintiffs after the NCUA agreed to issue a final
share draft regulation. 20 As soon as the final rule was promulgated by the
NCUA, 21 the American Bankers Association reinstituted the suit against the
Agency and its Administrator, Lawrence B. Connell, Jr., on similar grounds:
that is, that federal credit unions lack the statutory power to establish share
draft accounts.2 2 Of course, the NCUA believes that the credit unions possess
this power. Consistent with this belief, the Agency has been careful to
emphasize that its final rule was issued solely for the purpose of regulating
share draft accounts 23 and not to empower credit unions to issue them.2 4 The
NCUA position was accepted by the District Court for the District of
Columbia in American Bankers Association v. Connell.2s
16. 42 Fed. Reg. 11247, 11247 (1977). The share draft concept was jointly developed by
the Credit Union National Association (CUNA) and its wholly owned subsidiary ICU Services
Corporation. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 33. CUNA is a trade association composed of
51 state credit union leagues (including the District of Columbia). Membership in the leagues
consists of the vast majority of federal and state credit unions within each state. Id. at 82. ICU
Services Corporation is an income-producing corporation established by CUNA to provide
services to credit unions, such as a national interlending service among credit unions and a
government securities program whereby credit unions can invest in certain government obliga-
tions. Id. at 95-96.
17. As of September 30, 1976, 391 credit unions had received NCUA approval to operate
share draft programs on an experimental basis. 42 Fed. Reg. 61977, 61977 (1977). Of that
number, only 231 federal credit unions had commenced operation of the programs. Id.
18. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment and Mandamus. American Bank-
ers Ass'n v. Montgomery, No. 76-1661 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 1976).
19. Id. at 4. Another issue raised by the plaintiff concerned the propriety of the Adminis-
trator's action in establishing the pilot program for share drafts. Id. at S.
20. Order, American Bankers Ass'n v. Montgomery, No. 76-1661 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 1977).
21. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
22. American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102, slip op. at 1-3 (Mar. 7, 1978).
23. "This regulation prescribes the requirements for the establishment and implementation of
permanent share draft programs by Federal credit unions." 42 Fed. Reg. 61977, 61977 (1977).
24. After a thorough review of comments received during the rulemaking period, the NCUA
concluded in its final regulation that "share drafts were legal for Federal credit unions." Id. at
61977-78. The agency's belief that credit unions were empowered to issue share drafts, notwith-
standing the final regulation, is similarly evinced in hearings before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs. See note 214 infra and accompanying text.
25. No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978), discussed note 217 infra. The case is presently on
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell,
No. 77-2102 (D.C. Cir., filed Apr. 14, 1978).
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The purpose of this Comment, in light of the banking association's appeal
of the district court's decision, is to explore both the legal and policy questions
arising from the NCUA's final regulation. The first section will be devoted to
a discussion of some pertinent background material necessary for a clear
understanding of the share draft controversy. Among the topics covered are
the origin of credit unions, the history of the Federal Credit Union Act, and
the mechanics of the share draft programs as promulgated by the NCUA rule.
The second section will consider whether the federal credit unions have
express or implied power under the Act to commence share draft programs.
Finally, the third section will discuss whether share draft programs fall within
the spirit of the federal prohibition against interest-bearing demand deposits,
and if they do, whether in the interest of competitive fairness among financial
institutions that policy should be applied to federal credit unions also, or
whether the policy's application to other financial institutions should be
reexamined.
II. CREDIT UNION HISTORY AND LEGISLATION
A credit union is defined in the federal statute as "a cooperative association
organized . . . for the purpose of promoting thrift among its members and
creating a source of credit for provident or productive purposes. '26 This
definition bears some relation to the historical origins of credit unions, which
were first formed in the mid-nineteenth century in Germany. 27 Prompted by
religious and ethical considerations, these organizations were viewed "as a
means of eliminating evil by reducing poverty and as having restorative value
and character improvement possibilities because of the self-help aspects."' 28
This same ethical paternalism was instrumental in the formation of credit
unions in the United States in the twentieth century. Congress saw credit
unions as institutions which would enable their members "in good times to
accumulate some savings for protection against bad times . . . and [would
educate their] members in matters having to do with the sane and conserva-
tive management of their own money."'29 Nonetheless, in enacting the federal
statute, Congress was also prompted by a far more compelling secular
purpose-to provide a credit source for people of "small means, '30 who had
largely been unable to borrow from other financial institutions. 31 As a result,
these low income persons were forced to borrow from loan sharks, frequently
at usurious interest rates as high as forty-two percent or more. 32 By 1934
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1752(1) (1976).
27. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 9; Rose, Low Income Credit Unions and Consumer
Utility Deposits: Making Credit Available with Community Resources, 48 J. Urb. Law 233, 234
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Low Income Credit Unions]; Note, Credit Unions-Regulatory Control
Development-Problems-Recommendations, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 205, 207-08 (1964).
28. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 9.
29. S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
30. Id. at 1; 78 Cong. Rec. 12223 (1934).
31. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 8; 78 Cong. Rec. 12225 (1934).
32. 78 Cong. Rec. 12223 (1934). Another reason for the formation of a federal system of credit
unions was to eliminate the pernicious effect that usuriou:s interest rates had on the purchasing
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when the Federal Credit Union Act was passed, credit of over two billion
dollars a year was being extended by loan sharks in the United States.33
Credit unions, as cooperative associations, are able to fulfill their objective
of creating a source of credit. All members, by pooling their small savings
together, contribute to a source of funds from which loans can be made to any
member. 34 Not everyone, however, can join a particular credit union, since
membership is limited by federal law to those "groups having a common bond
of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood,
community, or rural district. '3s This "common bond" concept connotes a
group of people familiar with each other by reputation who will work together
for a common purpose. 36 Nevertheless, membership is not limited to natural
persons. The federal statute permits incorporated and unincorporated associa-
tions to become members of a credit union if they comply with the rules and
regulations prescribed by the NCUA Administrator. 37 Pursuant to this au-
thority, the Administrator has limited membership to those organizations
whose own members are also members of the federal credit union as individ-
uals. 3
8
The first credit union law in the United States was passed in Massachusetts
in 1909. 3 9 Its enactment was due primarily to the efforts of the Boston
merchant Edward A. Filene, who had become interested in the credit union
movement earlier that year when the first credit union in the United States
was established in New Hampshire. 40 After the Massachusetts statute was
enacted, Filene organized and financed a national credit union movement
designed to promote the passage of enabling statutes in other states.4
Largely as a result of this movement, thirty-nine states had enacted
chartering systems for state credit unions by the time of the passage of the
Federal Credit Union Act. 42 This meant, however, that by 1934 there were
power of the borrower, who, when unable to secure credit from a financial institution. resorted to
loan sharks. When measured, this reduction in consumer buying power was "the difference
between what the average worker should pay for credit and what he does pay for credit." S. Rep.
No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
33. 78 Cong. Rec. 12223 (1934); S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
34. Recommended Order at 2, Leon County Teachers Credit Union Case, No. 76-2091 (Fla.
Div. of Admin. Hearings June 6, 1977); 105 Cong. Rec. 11968 (1959); see D. Harless, Nonbank
Financial Institutions 70 (1975).
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (1976).
36. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 43.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (1976). Under the NCUA's final regulation, those associations that are
eligible for membership can access their share accounts by means of a share draft with the same
rights as members who are natural persons. See 42 Fed. Reg. 61977, 61983 (1977).
38. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 14. For example, if some or all of the members of a
federal credit union based upon an occupational common bond form an unincorporated or
incorporated business, then that business may become a member of the occupational credit union
so long as all of the owners of the business are members of the credit union.
39. 1909 lass. Acts ch. 419 (codified at Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 171 (MichielLaw- Co-op 1977))
40. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 11.
41. Id. at 78.
42. S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934). Altogether, a total of 46 states and Puerto
19781 1139
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nine states that had not yet enacted enabling statutes for credit unions.
4 3
Moreover, because of the strong pressure which had been applied by loan
shark lobbyists, many of the statutes which had been passed in the other
states contained restrictive organizational provisions. 44 Thus, in 1934 Con-
gress passed the Federal Credit Union Act for two reasons: to minimize the
pernicious effects of loan sharks on consumer purchasing power 45 and to
provide a source of credit for people of small means by establishing chartering
mechanisms in those states that were either without enabling statutes or had
statutes that were too restrictive to induce much state credit union organiza-
tion.4 6 With the Act's passage, a dual chartering system for credit unions
Rico have enacted credit union enabling statutes: Ala. Code tit. 5, §§ 5-17-1 to -17-28 (1975 &
Cum. Supp. 1977); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 6-501 to -535 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Ark. Stat.
Ann. §§ 67-901 to -922 (1966 & Supp. 1977); Cal. Fin. Code §§ 14000-16004 (West 1968 & Cum.
Supp. 1978); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-30-101 to -123 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1976); Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. §§ 36-194 to -224 (West 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1978); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 657.01-.268 (West
1966 & Cum. Supp. 1978); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 41A-3001 to -3120 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977);
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 410-1 to -45 (1976); Idaho Code §§ 26-2101 to -2188 (1977); IIl. Ann. Stat. ch.
32, §§ 496.1-.48 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 28-7-1-1 to -7-1-33 (Burns
1973 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 533.1-.38 (West 1970 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
Kan. Stat. §§ 17-2201 to -2262 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 290,010-.990 (1972
& Cum. Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 6:641-:669 (West 1951 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Me.
Rev. Stat. it. 9-B, §§ 811-882 (Supp. 1977); Md. Code Ann. art. 11, §§ 135-162 (1976 & Cum.
Supp. 1977); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 171, §§ 1-35 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1977), as amended by Act of
May 2, 1977, ch. 143, 1977 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. No. 3, at 23 (Lawyers Co-op), Act of Mar. 8,
1977, ch. 28, § 3, 1977 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. No. 1, at 17, 18 (Lawyers Co-op); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. §§ 490.1-.65 (1967 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 52.01-.24 (West
1970 & Cum. Supp. 1978); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 81-13-1 to -13-75 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo.
Ann. Stat. §§ 370.010-.382 (Vernon 1968 & Cum. Supp. 1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 14-601
to -677 (Supp. 1975); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 21-1760 tc, -17,126 (1977); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§
678.010-.880 (1977); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 394:1-:53 (1968 & Supp. 1977); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§
17:13-26 to -74 (West 1970 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 48-19-1 to -19A-15
(Supp. 1975), as amended by Commerce and Industry Department Act, ch. 245, §§ 113-117, 1977
N.M. Laws 943, 1097-1101; N.Y. Banking Law §§ 450 to 480-b (McKinney 1971 & Supp.
1977-1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-109.1 to -110 (Supp. 1975), as amended by Act of June 14,
1977, ch. 559, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. No. 9, at 329) (Michie); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 6-06-01
to -06-40 (1975 & Supp. 1977); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 9, 1733.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1977); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2023 (West 1966 & Cum. Supp 1977-1978); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 723.002
to -. 992 (1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 12301-12333 (Purdon 1967 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 7, §§ 1101-1143 (Cum. Supp. 1976); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 19-21-1 to -53 (1968
& Cum. Supp. 1977); S.C. Code §§ 34-27-10 to -270 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 45-1801 to -1850 (1964 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2461-1.01 to
-11.17 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-9-1 to -31 (1971 & Supp. 1977); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 8, §§ 2051-2086 (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Va. Code §§ 6.1-196 to -226 (1973 & Cum.
Supp. 1977); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 31.12.010-.12A.940 (1961 & Supp. 1976); W. Va. Code
§§ 31-10-1 to -10-35 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 186.01-.38 (West 1957 &
Gum. Supp. 1977-1978), as amended by Act of Nov. 8, 1977, ch. 152, 1977 Wis. Legis. Serv. 735
(West).
43. There were only forty-eight states in the United States in 1934.
44. See 78 Cong. Rec. 12226 (1934).
45. S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); see note 32 supra.
46. See 78 Cong. Rec. 12225-26 (1934); S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
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came into existence. The federal statute borrowed heavily from the state
statutes in existence before its passage. 47 In turn, the seven states48 that have
passed general credit union laws since 1934 have used both the state and
federal acts as models. 49 Because of this similarity, state court and adminis-
trative decisions concerning state credit union laws are instructive in the
interpretation of the federal statute and will be utilized fully throughout this
Comment in considering the legality offederal credit union share drafts under
the Federal Credit Union Act.50
In order to organize a federal credit union, seven or more natural persons
must file an organization certificate with the NCUA Administrator.51 Upon
the approval of the certificate by the Administrator, the credit union's
corporate existence under federal law begins.5 2 Once incorporated, the credit
union is vested with all the powers and made subject to all the limitations set
forth in the federal statute.5 3 Among the enumerated powers are those
normally granted to all corporations, such as the power to make contracts and
to sue and be sued.5 4 In addition, some powers peculiar to financial institu-
47. The Federal Credit Union Act is "modeled after the better laws in the States .... " 78
Cong. Rec. 12224 (1934). This comment echoed an earlier statement made at the time of the bill's
introduction when it was said that the proposed federal chartering system followed the effective
method of operation that had been established under state laws. 77 Cong. Rec. 3206 (1933).
48. The seven state credit union laws enacted since 1934 are: Connecticut Credit Union Act,
ch. 215d, 1946-1947 Conn. Sess. Laws 547 (1947); Hawaii Credit Union Act, ch. 194, 1973 Haw.
Sess. Laws 336; Act of Feb. 21, 1935, ch. 42, 1935 Idaho Sess. Laws 72; Act of Mar. 26, 1940,
ch. 19, 1940 Ky. Acts 177; Act of Apr. 29, 1975, ch. 292, 1975 Nev. Stats. 376; Act of Apr. 13,
1945, ch. 129, 1945 N.M. Laws 226; Act of Mar. 22, 1968, No. 312, 1967-1968 Vt. Acts Adj.
Sess. 287. There are still no state credit union laws in Alaska, Delaware, South Dakota, and
Wyoming. CUNA Governmental Affairs Division, Credit Union Nat'l Ass'n, Comparative Digest
of Credit Union Acts 111 (1977 ed.).
49. For example, as in the Federal Credit Union Act, all seven state credit union acts
explicitly empower credit unions to establish share accounts. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-198(b)
(West Cum. Supp. 1978) ("receive payments on shares"); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 410-12(f)(6) (1976)
("receive . . . payments on shares"); Idaho Code § 26-2108(f) (1977) ("receive . . . payments on
shares"); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 290.070(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976) ('receive the savings of its members in
payment for shares'); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 678.530(1) (1973) ("[s]hares may be subscribed to");
N.M. Stat. Ann § 48-19-12 (Supp. 1975) ("capital of a credit union shall consist of the payments
... on shares"); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 2054(6) (Supp. 1977) ("receive savings from its members in
the form of shares). As will be discussed later, this power to permit share accounts is
fundamental to the issue of a credit union's power to establish share drafts. See pt Ill infra.
50. See pt. Il infra.
51. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1753-1754 (1976). While a corporation or unincorporated association can
become a member of a credit union when the corporation's members are also members of the
federal credit union in their individual capacity, a corporation cannot incorporate a federal credit
union because of the natural person requirement for incorporators.
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1754 (1976). Factors which the statute requires the Administrator to take into
account are "(1) whether the organization certificate conforms to the provisions of this chapter, (2)
the general character and fitness of the subscribers thereto; and (3) the economic advisability of
establishing the proposed Federal credit union." Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. § 1757(1), (2).
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tions are granted. These include the power to sell negotiable checks and
money orders."S Conspicuously missing among the express powers is a refer-
ence to the manner in which the funds may be withdrawn. The absence of
such a provision is largely responsible for the legal controversy over share
drafts.
In order to administer the federal statute, Congress created the National
Credit Union Administration in 1970.56 Prior to that date, credit unions had
been regulated by the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions, an administrative
subagency which had been transferred from one government agency to
another, including the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare."7 This frequent relocation conferred step-
child status on the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions 8 and, as a result,
retarded the development of its administrative policies." Thus, a con-
gressional objective in forming the NCUA was to create a separate credit
union agency that "would be able to be more responsive to the needs of credit
unions and to provide more flexible and innovative regulation."'60
The NCUA consists of an Administrator, who is the chief executive officer
of the agency, and a National Credit Union Board. 6 1 In order to ensure that
the Administrator work in close cooperation with the Board, 62 the Act
requires that he must consult with the Board on all matters of policy and must
include its recommendations and comments in the Annual Report he is
required to submit to Congress. 63 The Administrator is also empowered to
prescribe rules and regulations for the Administration of the Act, to revoke or
suspend a credit union's charter or to place it in involuntary liquidation, to
delegate any function or duty vested in him under the statute, and to perform
any function necessary in order to carry out his duties under the Act. 64
55. See id. § 1757(13).
56. Act of Mar. 10, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-206, § 3, 84 Stat. 49.
57. The regulatory structure for federal credit unions has gone through six phases since the
passage of the 1934 Act: (1) in 1934, the Farm Credit Administration was placed in control; (2)
the Farm Credit Administration lost its independent status as an agency in 1939, and from then
on it regulated credit unions as a unit of the Department of Agriculture; (3) pursuant to his war
powers, the President in 1942 transferred the control over credit unions to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation; (4) the Federal Security Agency took over the reins in 1948; (5) in 1953,
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare became the responsible regulatory agency;
and, finally, (6) the NCUA was created as an independent agency in 1970. Governmental Affairs
Division, Credit Union National Association, Legislative History of the Federal Credit Union Act
3-4 (1975).
58. H.R. Rep. No. 331, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969).
59. S. Rep. No. 518, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [19701 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2479, 2480.
60. Id. at 3, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2481.
61. See 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(a) (1976).
62. H.R. Rep. No. 841, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2484, 2485.
63. See 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(e) (1976).
64. See id. § 1766(a), (b)(1), (d), (i)(2).
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Pursuant to his power to prescribe rules, the NCUA Administrator on
December 8, 1977, promulgated a regulation that established the require-
ments for the maintenance of share draft programs by credit unions. 6 -
Congress had mandated in 1969 that the NCUA be more responsive than its
predecessor had been to the needs of credit union members in an evolving
economy. 66 Thus, the regulation was specifically intended to provide "mem-
bers with a contemporary means of withdrawing funds maintained in their
share accounts." 67
Share accounts, the most prevalent type of credit union account, histori-
cally have been subject to withdrawal by the member in person or by written
request of the member through the mail.68 In today's electronic world, these
traditional methods of withdrawal have become anachronistic and inconve-
nient. Share drafts, however, provide the member with a more modern
alternative: the remote withdrawal of share account funds by draft. 69 From
the book of drafts he receives when he opens the account, 70 a member can
draw a draft on his credit union payable to himself or a third party.7 The
payee deposits the draft into his bank account. The draft works its way
through the check clearing system to the "payable through bank," which
notifies the credit union of the amount drawn on it. 72 The credit union then
65. 42 Fed. Reg. 11247 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 701.34); see notes 9-13 supra and
accompanying text.
66. See S. Rep. No. 518, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2479, 2481.
67. 42 Fed. Reg. 11247 (1977); see id. at 61978.
68. Iowa Credit Union League v. Iowa Dep't of Banking, CE 6-3152, slip op. at 5 (lowa Dist.
Ct. May 24, 1977).
69. Congress itself, in a recent committee report accompanying a bill which proposes to give
express share draft power to credit unions, has recognized that share drafts "eliminate the delay
and inconvenience inherent in making withdrawals by the more traditional means" of with-
drawal. S. Rep. No. 407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977). For a discussion of the proposed
legislation, see notes 205-07, 213-15 infra and accompanying text.
70. Depending on the board of directors' discretion, the credit union can provide the book of
drafts to the member with or without charge. 42 Fed. Reg. 61977, 61980 (1977) (to be codified in
12 C.F.R. § 701.34(b)). Each blank draft in the book has a carbonless duplicate. When the
member draws a draft, a duplicate is created which the member can retain for his records.
Because of this, the share draft system is truncated; that is, neither the credit union nor its
member receive the cancelled share draft from the "payable through bank." Id. at 11248. Instead,
the draft remains with the "payable through bank." Id. That bank microfilms the draft. After a
certain period of time the original draft is destroyed and only the microfilm copy is retained by the
bank for its records. Id. For a discussion of this truncated system, see notes 284-86 iqfra and
accompanying text.
71. Id. at 11247.
72. Id. at 11247-48. The payee could also present the draft for payment directly to the
drawer's credit union without going through the check clearing process. Id. at 11248. Alterna-
tively, he could deposit the draft into his account at the credit union of which he is a member. If
the credit union is the same as the drawer's, the credit union can then credit his account and debit
the drawer's account. If their credit unions are different, the payee's credit union will give a
provisional credit to his account and will deposit the draft in its bank account for collection.
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pays this amount to the bank, and debits the member's account. 73
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (Code), the share draft takes the legal
form of an order74 made by the member to his credit union to pay the funds to
himself or a third party. The instrument is a draft, 75 and it is payable on
demand because "no time for payment is stated. '7 6 Although withdrawable
by means of a draft payable on demand, a share draft account is not a
demand deposit 77 because it is subject to the credit union's right to 60-day
notice of withdrawal.7 8 This is not contradictory since a draft payable on
demand can be written by the drawer to collect an obligation that is not
represented by a demand deposit.7 9 A demand deposit refers to the
depositor-bank relationship under which the bank is obligated to pay the draft
when presented, without any right to receive a notice of withdrawal from the
depositor.80 The draft payable on demand, however, is associated with the
Code's treatment of the depositor-payee relationship and means that the
depositor has not designated any time when the payee must present the draft
for payment to the bank.8 1 Therefore, while a payee holding a share draft can
present the draft to the drawer's credit union as soon as he receives it, he
might not be paid upon presentment if the credit union exercises its right to
60-day notice of withdrawal.
73. Id. at 11248. Upon receipt of the draft, the "payable through bank" converts the
information into an electronic medium which is used to deliver the request to the credit union to
pay the draft. The draft itself is not returned to the credit union or its member. See note 70 supra.
The credit union can then make the payment by transferring funds to the bank or by maintaining
a settlement account at the "payable through bank" from which the funds can be automatically
withdrawn, provided that the bank has not been notified by the credit union of a stop order or a
deficiency in the member's account. 42 Fed. Reg. 11247, 11248 (1977).
74. "An 'order' is a direction to pay and must be more than an authorization or request."
U.C.C. § 3-102(I)(b).
75. A draft is an order which can be negotiable or nonnegotiable. Id. § 3-104(2)(a), (3). Six
requirements must be complied with for the draft to be negotiable: It must be (1) a writing, (2)
signed by the drawer, (3) containing an unconditional order, (4) to pay a sum certain in money, (S)
on demand or at a definite time, (6) to bearer or to order. Id. § 3-104(1).
76. Id. § 3-108. If a date for payment were stated on the share draft, it would then be payable
at a definite time since it would be payable "on or before a stated date . . . ... Id. § 3-109(1)(a).
This would be a time draft, instead of a draft payable on demand (demand draft).
77. Federal reserve regulations define demand deposits as all deposits that are not time or
savings deposits. 12 C.F.R. § 217. 1(a) (1977). Thus, a demand deposit includes any deposit that
does not require a notice of withdrawal or does not give the bank the right to require notice of
withdrawal. See 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(b), (c), (d), (e)(2) (1977).
78. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, a share draft account is not a demand
deposit for the additional reason that credit union accounts are not deposits at all. See notes
243-45 infra and accompanying text.
79. Comment, The Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) Account: "Checking Accounts"for
Savings Banks?, 14 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 471, 494 n.121 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
(NOW) Account]; Testimony at Final Hearing, Vol. III, at 130-01 (Dr. E. Allan Farnsworth),
Leon County Teachers Credit Union Case, No. 76-2091 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings Sept. 6,
1977).
80. (NOW) Account, supra note 79, at 494 n. 121.
81. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
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mII. LEGALITY OF CREDIT UNION SHARE DRAFTS
The central issue which must be resolved in the controversy between the
American Bankers Association and the NCUA is whether credit unions have
the authority under the Federal Credit Union Act to establish share accounts
that are subject to withdrawal by negotiable or nonnegotiable draft. Under
the Act, a federal credit union may "receive ... payments on shares. ' 2 This
power enables a credit union to accept funds from its members for deposit
into a share account.8 3 Share accounts are a hybrid of the permanent share
capital of a corporation and a deposit at a commercial bank. 84 The account
holder acquires ownership rights in the credit union. These include the right
to vote in certain credit union affairs, such as the election of the board of
directors and the credit committee,8 5 and the right to earn "dividends"8 6 as a
return on his investment. Unlike the owners of common stock, however, each
member is entitled to only one vote irrespective of the number of shares he
holds.8 7 This difference in voting rights results from the cooperative nature of
credit unions.88 On the other hand, the share account resembles a commercial
bank deposit in that the funds are subject to withdrawal by the member. 89
But, while a share account results in a contractual relationship between the
member and the credit union, 90 it is unlike a bank deposit in that it does not
also create a debtor-creditor relationship. 91 Overall, a credit union account
82. Federal Credit Union Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, § 303(a), 91 Stat. SI
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1757(7) (1976)). Payments may also be received on share certificates. Id.
These are comparable to bank certificates of deposit. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 26.
Share certificate accounts are not at issue here, however, since share drafts can only be drawn on
regular share accounts. See 42 Fed. Reg. 61977, 61980 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §
701.34(a)(1), (4)).
83. See Iowa Credit Union League v. Iowa Dep't of Banking, CE 6-31S2, slip op. at 3 (Iowa
Dist. CL May 24, 1977).
84. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 24-25.
85. 12 U.S.C. § 1761 (1976).
86. Federal Credit Union Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, § 303(a), 91 Stat. SI
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1757(7) (1976)). As has been mentioned, share accounts technically earn
dividends, not interest. See note 10 supra.
87. 12 U.S.C. § 1760 (1976).
88. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 7.
89. "Money paid in on shares... may be withdrawn as provided in these bylaws on any day
when payment on shares may be made." Standard Federal Credit Union Bylaws art. In, § S.
Even if the bylaws did not explicitly permit members to withdraw funds, the power to receive
payments on shares implies the power of a credit union to allow withdrawals. Leon County
Teachers Credit Union Case, No. 76-2091, at 4 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings Sept. 6, 1977),
Michigan Bankers' Ass'n Case (Fin. Inst. Bureau, Michigan Dep't of Commerce Mar. 17, 1977);
see pt. M11(A) infra.
90. Iowa Credit Union League v. Iowa Dep't of Banking, CE 6-3152, slip op. at 16 (Iowa Dist.
Ct. May 24, 1977); LaValley v. Pere Marquette Employes' Credit Union, 342 Mich. 639, 644, 70
N.W.2d 798, 800 (1955).
91. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 24. Share accounts bear a closer resemblance to a
dividend-earning equity instrument than an interest-earning debt instrument. 42 Fed. Reg,
60905, 60905-06 (1977). The NCUA was careful to make this distinction in its final rule regulating
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has more of the attributes of equity than debt. 92 As a result, the general
creditors of a credit union would take precedence over the account holders in
the event of dissolution. 93
Although members may withdraw the funds deposited in their share
accounts, the Act is silent on the permissible methods of doing so. Indeed,
before the new share draft rule was issued, the only reference to withdrawals
from a regular share account in the NCUA regulations stated that any
governmental unit investing public funds in a credit union account was
subject to the credit union's right to require a 60-day notice of withdrawal. 94
The bylaws, with the exception of a similar restriction on the withdrawal
rights of all members from regular share accounts," are equally silent. Thus,
prior to the new share draft rule, neither the statute, regulations, nor standard
bylaws explicitly empowered credit unions to establish any methods of
withdrawal, let alone the use of share drafts. It is submitted, however, that
credit unions have the implied power to establish methods of withdrawal and
that this includes the power to permit withdrawals by means of negotiable or
nonnegotiable drafts. Two theories advanced in support of this position will
be discussed below.
A. Power To Permit Withdrawals by Any Reasonable Method
Since credit unions have the power to receive payments on shares and the
power to allow withdrawals from those share accounts, 96 it was held by the
Iowa State District Court in Iowa Credit Union League v. Iowa Department
of Banking97 that credit unions have the implied power to permit withdrawals
by any reasonable method. 98 Although this case concerned state-chartered
credit unions, it arose out of facts strikingly similar to the federal share draft
case. On January 22, 1976, the state superintendent of banking, after receiv-
ing two opinion letters from the attorney general of Iowa stating that share
draft accounts were legal under Iowa law, authorized the credit union league
to allow individual credit unions to establish such accounts. The Iowa
Bankers Association then petitioned the Department of Banking for a de-
claratory ruling on the legality of share drafts. The Department held that it
the issuance of share certificate accounts. See id. The Administrator felt that if share certificates
could earn dividends that were absolutely guaranteed, then the holders of the accounts would
cease to be shareholders, and would instead become creditors, of the credit union, Since the
guaranteeing of dividends would result in a debtor-creditor relationship between the member and
the organization, the regulation specified that dividend. could be paid on share certificate
accounts at the rate contracted for in advance only if sufficient earnings exist. See id. at 60906.
92. See id. at 60905-06.
93. Credit Union Study, supra note 1, at 24.
94. See 12 C.F.R. § 701.32(b) (1977). Governmental units, while not credit union members,
were permitted to open share accounts in federal credit unions beginning in 1974. Act of Oct. 28,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 101(d), 88 Stat. 1502 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1757(7) (1976)).
95. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 82, 89 supra and accompanying text.
97. CE 6-3152 (Iowa Dist. Ct. May 24, 1977).
98. Id., slip op. at 15.
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was unlawful for Iowa credit unions to conduct share draft programs. 99 In
overruling the administrative decision, the trial court noted that Iowa state-
chartered credit unions have the power to receive the savings of their
members as payments on share accounts, 100 subject to withdrawal "whenever
and as frequently as the member desires" unless the credit union exercises the
right to a 60-day notice.10 1 The court concluded that this power to receive
withdrawable shares, in order to be effective, must give rise to the implied
power to permit withdrawals by any reasonable commercial practice,102
regardless of whether an incidental powers clause existed in the Iowa credit
union statute.1 0 3
In accord with the Iowa decision is a declaratory ruling by the Oklahoma
Credit Union Board in Oklahoma Bankers Association v. Oklahoma Credit
Union League. 104 In this action brought by the state's bankers association, the
Board upheld its own rule 15, which permitted state-chartered credit unions
to issue share drafts, on the ground that a credit union's "power to receive
shares and deposits implies the power to permit withdrawals through any
reasonable commercial practices, by agreement of the parties."' 0 5
Since there is authority for the proposition that a credit union's express
power to receive withdrawable shares gives rise to an implied power to
permit withdrawals by reasonable methods, the question then becomes
whether share drafts are a reasonable method. In Iowa Credit Union
League, 1 0 6 the court answered this question affirmatively for two reasons: 1)
drafts can be drawn on anyone under common law in the absence of a
legislative proscription, 10 7 and 2) share drafts are a logical extension of the
traditional means of withdrawal from share accounts.' 08
A share draft falls within the Code's definition of a "draft" because it is an
99. Id., slip op. at 6-7.
100. Id., slip op. at 15. The statute provides that credit unions can "[receive the savings of
its members either as payment on shares or as deposits." Iowa Code Ann. § 533.4(1) (West 1970).
Federal credit unions may only receive payments on shares. Federal Credit Union Act Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, § 303(a), 91 Stat. 51 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1757(7) (1976)).
This difference, however, does not diminish the value of the case for interpreting the Federal
Credit Union Act since the Iowa holding implied a power to permit reasonable methods of
withdrawal for both share accounts and deposits. CE -3152, slip op. at 15 (Iowa Dist. CL May
24, 1977).
101. CE 6-3152, slip op. at 15 (Iowa Dist. Ct. May 24, 1977).
102. Id.
103. Id., slip op. at 17.
104. Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n Case (Okla. Credit Union Bd. May 17, 1977); accord, Position
Paper on Credit Union Share Draft Accounts (Ill. Dep't of Fin. Inst. Sept. 15, 1977).
105. Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n Case, slip op. at 10 (Okla. Credit Union Bd. May 17, 1977).
The Oklahoma provision on receiving shares is similar to the Iowa section. It empowers a credit
union "[t]o receive from its members... payments on shares and deposits." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
6, § 2006(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
106. CE 6-3152 (Iowa Dist. Ct. May 24, 1977).
107. Id., slip op. at 12-13.
108. Id., slip op. at 4.
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order by a member on his credit union to pay himself or a third person. 109
Under common law, any person who could make a contract 1 0 could draw a
draft on any other person."' Of course, as a general rule, drawees do not
gratuitously pay drafts drawn on them.'1 2 At the core of almost every draft is
a monetary obligation owing from the drawee to the drawer. 113 In a case
where goods have been sold and delivered by the drawer, the obligation
owing to the drawer is the agreed upon purchase price. Similarly, in the case
of a credit union share draft, the obligation owing from the credit union, as
drawee, to the member, as drawer, is the repayment of funds kept on deposit
in a share draft account with the credit union. 1 4 Thus, as a matter of
common law, there is little question that a share draft can be drawn by the
member on his credit union for the purpose of withdrawing funds from his
account. This right continues to exist under the Federal Credit Union Act in
the absence of any proscription. " Is Since no express provisions concerning the
permissible methods of withdrawal from credit union accounts exist under the
Act, NCUA regulations or bylaws, 116 there would seem to be no prohibition
on the power of a member to exercise his right to draw drafts on his credit
union.
Credit union share drafts would also appear to be a reasonable method of
withdrawal since they are a logical extension of other share account with-
drawal methods. Traditionally, credit unions have utilized various two-party
and three-party methods of withdrawal."i 7 The two-party methods, wherein
the credit union member is both drawer and payee, include withdrawal in
person by the member and withdrawal by phone or by mail. 118 Under the
three-party methods, a member can order the credit union to transfer funds
from his account to another credit union member's account; he can order the
109. See notes 74-75 supra and accompanying text.
110. Testimony at Final Hearing, Vol. III, at 134-35 (Dr. E. Allan Farnsworth), Leon
County Teachers Credit Union Case, No. 76-2091 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings Sept. 6, 1977).
111. Iowa Credit Union League v. Iowa Dep't of Banking, CE 6-3152, slip op. at 13 (Iowa
Dist. Ct. May 24, 1977); Testimony at Final Hearing, Vol. III, at 128 (Dr. E. Allan Farnsworth),
Leon County Teachers Credit Union Case, No. 76-2091 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings Sept. 6,
1977). This principle has been carried over to the U.C.C. As an order, a draft "must identify the
person to pay with reasonable certainty." U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(b). The person who must pay as
drawee can be individual or an organization. Id. § 1-201(30). An organization is broadly defined
to include businesses, governments, and partnerships, among others. Id. § 1-201(28).
112. Testimony at Final Hearing, Vol. I, at 128-29 (Dr. E. Allan Farnsworth), Leon
County Teachers Credit Union Case, No. 76-2091 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings Sept. 6, 1977).
113. See id. at 129.
114. See Iowa Credit Union League v. Iowa Dep't of Banking, CE 6-3152, slip op. at 3 (Iowa
Dist. Ct. May 24, 1977).
115. Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1959); Isbrandtsen
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S.
426, 437 (1907). Such a prohibition does exist in the case of federal savings and loan associations.
See note 166 infra and accompanying text.
116. See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.




credit union to transfer funds from his account to an account at another
financial institution; and he can authorize his credit union in advance to pay
recurring expenses like mortgage and insurance payments out of his share
account.1 19 Both the two and three-party methods are similar to share drafts.
Each technique involves an order by the credit union member directing the
credit union to pay himself or a third person. The primary difference among
the methods would appear to be theform of the orderI2 -- whether it is made
in person, by mail, by draft, or by phone. That this is an insignificant legal
distinction was observed by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Savings Bank
of Baltimore v. Bank Commissioner. 12 1 In that case a savings bank petitioned
for declaratory relief against the bank commissioner of Maryland who, on the
basis of a state attorney general's opinion, had refused to allow savings banks
to receive deposits subject to withdrawal by check. The court, in overturning
the lower court's decision in favor of the commissioner, noted:
If, as would seem to be conceded, a depositor of the [Savings] Bank, on making a
withdrawal, has the option of requesting cash, or a treasurer's check, or of purchasing
a money order, it seems abundantly clear to us that according him a fourth option of
drawing a check on his own account, whether or not he presents his passbook, is a
distinction without a difference. 122
The right of credit unions to permit share drafts as a reasonable method of
withdrawal stands on even firmer ground when the chartering statute con-
tains an incidental powers clause under which this power can be implied. 1
23
Such a provision is present in the Federal Credit Union Act, and it provides
that a federal credit union shall have power "to exercise such incidental
powers as shall be necessary or requisite to enable it to carry on effectively the
business for which it is incorporated."'2 The limitation on a federal credit
union's incidental powers-the business for which the organization is
119. Id., slip op. at 5-6; Brief of Petitioners at 13-14, Leon County Teachers Credit Union
Case, No. 76-2091 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings Sept. 6, 1977).
120. There is no distinction with regard to the payment of the order, however. When a
member verbally orders his credit union to transfer funds from his account to a third person,
payment is made when the credit union issues its own check to the third party. Similarly, a credit
union pays a share draft order only after the "payable through bank" has presented the draft to
the credit union and the credit union has drawn its own check payable to the bank. The share
draft, in itself, does not represent a payment by the credit union. See U.C.C. § 3-409(1); Brief of
Petitioners at 15-16, Leon County Teachers Credit Union Case, No. 76-2091 (Fla. Div. of Admin.
Hearings Sept. 6, 1977).
121. 248 Md. 461, 237 A.2d 45 (1968).
122. Id. at 475, 237 A.2d at 53 (emphasis added). The Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Committee acknowledged the similarity between share drafts and previously existing
methods of withdrawal when it said: "[Tjhe concept of a dividend earning transaction account is
not a recent development for Federal credit unions. The practice of members accessing their share
accounts, by means other than appearing in person, to pay bills goes back several years." S. Rep
No. 407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
123. Iowa Credit Union League v. Iowa Dep't of Banking, CE 6-3152, slip op. at 17 (Iowa
Dist. Ct. May 24, 1977).
124. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(15) (1976).
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incorporated-may be interpreted in two ways: either that the business of a
credit union includes only the express powers granted to it under the federal
statute, or that its business includes any act suited to the purpose for which it
is organized, to promote thrift and create a source of credit for its mem-
bers. 125 In either case, share draft programs do appear to further the business
for which a credit union is incorporated. If the business of a credit union is
defined as the express powers enumerated in -the Federal Credit Union Act,
then the implied power of permitting reasonable methods of withdrawal must
be necessary to one or more of the express powers. In interpreting a similar
incidental powers clause 126 under the National Bank Act, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that there must be some connection between the
incidental activity and the express power in order for the activity to be an
incidental power. 127 Certainly, this connection exists here since the power of a
credit union to receive payments on withdrawable shares would be nugatory
if, in the absence of legislative direction, the credit union could not designate
reasonable methods by which the funds might be withdrawn.
The credit union's "business," however, could also mean its statutory
purposes. Under the Act, a credit union is organized for two purposes: to
promote thrift among its members and to create a source of credit for
provident or productive purposes. 128 While credit union share draft accounts
will not cause credit union members to save more money than they do
presently, their establishment would seem to further the "business" of a credit
union by enlarging the institution's existing credit base. As a result, the power
to permit share drafts as a reasonable method of withdrawal arises, by
implication, under the incidental powers clause of the federal statute.
Share draft accounts, because of their draft withdrawal feature, will be
used primarily by members as transaction accounts,' 29 that is, accounts from
which depositors can meet their ordinary expenses. 1 30 As transaction ac-
counts, share drafts will compete directly with bank checking accounts. This
competition, however, will not induce credit union members to save more of
their income in the aggregate.13' While a share draft account is at a competi-
125. See id. § 1752(1).
126. A national bank shall have power "[t]o exercise . . . all such incidental powers as shall
be necessary to carry on the business of banking." Id. § 24 Seventh.
127. Arnold Tours, Inc., v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 432 (Ist Cir. 1972).
128. 12 U.S.C. § 1752(1) (1976).
129. See S. Rep. No. 407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1977). NCUA data gathered during the
experimental period confirms the view that share drafts will be used for transaction purposes.
These statistics evince a marked increase in the number of withdrawals from share accounts
subject to withdrawal by draft. See 42 Fed. Reg. 61977, 61982 (1977).
130. See Leon County Teachers Credit Union Case, No. 76-2091, slip op. at 5 (Fla. Div. of
Admin. Hearings Sept. 6, 1977).
131. The federal statute does not indicate whether the business of a credit union is to promote
thrift exclusively within the credit union or to induce saving in the aggregate by members,
regardless of the institution into which it is deposited. In light of the legislative history, however,
it would seem more probable that the latter was intended. Congress believed that credit unions
were necessary since the then existing systems for saving money were not being utilized by
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tive advantage to a checking account because of its interest-earning capabil-
ity, 132 the recognition of this advantage by credit union members will only
prompt them to transfer transaction balances from their checking accounts to
share draft accounts, and not to save any more of their income.
Moreover, the establishment of share draft accounts, while it will not
discourage thrift, will not cause those members who have previously put their
savings, as opposed to transaction, balances in share accounts or bank savings
accounts to become more thrifty. Share draft accounts, as share accounts,
may pay up to 7% interest per year, 133 while thrift funds deposited at any
insured savings and loan association may only earn up to 5/4% interest per
year, 134 and savings accounts at insured commercial banks are limited to a
5% interest yield per year. 135 This difference, however, will not induce credit
union members to save more for several reasons. First, this same interest
differential is presently available between share accounts and savings ac-
counts at other financial institutions.13 6 Thus, if the existence of the 7%
return has the effect of prompting members to save more, then the extra
savings caused by the rate differential would already be reflected in share
account balances. Second, the 7% return is not guaranteed. While savings
deposits contractually obligate a commercial bank to pay the agreed upon rate
of return to its account holders, 13 7 the rate of interest to be paid on a credit
union account is within the board of directors' discretion. ' 38 This discretion is
limited, however, by the requirement that any interest declared must be
payable from credit union earnings after the provision for reserves has been
"people of small means." See S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934). Thus, the
congressional intention would seem to be to induce credit union members to save money by
means of credit unions, and not necessarily the promotion of thrift exclusively within credit
unions.
132. See notes 252-55 infra and accompanying text.
133. Standard Federal Credit Union Bylaws art. XIV, § 2. In 1976, federal credit unions
averaged an annual interest rate of 6.15%. 1976 Annual Report of the National Credit Union
Administration 13 (1977).
134. 12 C.F.R1 § 526.3 (1977). This regulation applies to any "regular account," which means
any savings account which is not a certificate account or a notice account. Id. § 526. l(d). A
"regular account" would therefore include those savings accounts which, like share drafts, give
the association the right to receive notice of withdrawal, but do not require such notice.
135. Id. § 329.6(c) restricts the payment of interest to 5% or less by all non-Federal Reserve
member banks which opt for FDIC insurance coverage. All Federal Reserve member banks must
be insured by the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1814(b) (1976). As members, these banks are similarly
prevented from offering interest greater than 5%. 12 C.F.R. § 217.7(c) (1977).
136. Compare Standard Federal Credit Union Bylaws art. XIV, § 2, with 12 C.F.R. §§
217.7(c), 329.6(c), 526.3 (1977).
137. The obligation to pay a specified rate of interest on savings deposits results from the
debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. See Credit Union Study, supra
note 1, at 24.
138. Federal Credit Union Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, § 310, 91 Stat. 53
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1763 (1976)); Standard Federal Credit Union Bylaws art. XIV, § 1(c).
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made. 139 Thus, while a member can potentially earn 7% on his share draft
account, it is also conceivable that he could receive no return if credit union
earnings are insufficient to cover the required reserves. Third, the interest
differential is mitigated by the fact that interest credit can only be earned on
funds remaining in the share account until the end of the interest period,140
typically a quarter, 14 1 while savings accounts at other financial institutions
usually earn interest from the day of deposit to the day of withdrawal. 142
While a power to permit share drafts as a reasonable method of withdrawal
may not facilitate the business of a credit union by promoting thrift, 143 it will
139. Federal Credit Union Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, § 310, 91 Stat. 53
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1763 (1976)); Standard Federal Credit Union Bylaws art. XIV § 1(c).
140. Standard Federal Credit Union Bylaws art. XIV, § 1(d).
141. In 1976, fewer than 3% of all federal credit unions established interest periods of a
duration shorter than quarterly. See 1976 Annual Report of the National Credit Union Adminis-
tration 14-15 (1977).
142. For example, interest is earned from day of deposit to day of withdrawal at over 65% of
the commercial banks which participated in a congressional study in the New York City and
Washington, D.C., metropolitan areas. See Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
United States Senate, Consumers Guide to Banking 35-36 (1976).
143. See notes 129-42 supra and accompanying text. This is not to say, however, that share
draft accounts, as transaction accounts, are not within the incidental powers of credit unions at
all simply because these accounts do not promote thrift. Two state courts have held that the
offering by savings banks of similar transaction accounts was not within the incidental powers of
those thrift institutions in light of traditional savings bank functions. Androscoggin County Say.
Bank v. Campbell, 282 A.2d 858 (Me. 1971); New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 38
N.Y.2d 430, 343 N.E.2d 735, 381 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1975). Those decisions, however, are not
applicable to the issuance of share draft accounts in that the historical functions of credit unions
differ from those of savings banks.
In the two savings bank decisions, the courts concluded that transaction accounts were foreign
to the traditional objectives of savings banks to promote thrift and to provide a source of
long-term credit, since money deposited into transaction accounts, in that it must be available to
meet the withdrawal demand of depositors, cannot be inve.ted in long-term assets. 282 A.2d at
863 (offering of checking accounts by Maine savings banks); 38 N.Y.2d at 439, 343 N.E.2d at
740, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 22 (offering of non-interest-bearing negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW)
accounts by New York savings banks). While federal credit unions, like savings banks, were
organized for the purpose of promoting thrift, they were not established by Congress to be
long-term investors. Under the 1934 Act, credit unions were granted the power to make loans
with maturities of only two years or less. Federal Credit Union Act, ch. 750, § 7(5), 48 Stat. 1218
(1934). The intent was that credit unions should meet the "normal short-term-credit" needs of the
member. S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934). Congress has gradually lengthened
permissible loan maturities to include even thirty-year residential mortgages. See Federal Credit
Union Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, § 302(a), 91 Stat. 49 (amending 12 U.S.C. §
1757(5) (1976)). Congress, however, has not sought to alter the essential character of credit union
lending. Thus, in the House report to the amendment permitting mortgage lending it was clearly
stated that "such a removal of. . . loan limits is in no way intended to provide an incentive for
credit unions to abandon their tradition of providing for the small borrowers." H. Rep. No. 23,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 105, 112. In order to
ensure that credit unions did not begin emphasizing long-term loans at the expense of other more
modest borrowings, Congress empowered the NCUA to "impose maximums on the percentage of
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create a source of credit for credit union members. 144 This statutory purpose
of credit unions was foremost in the mind of Mr. Steagall, the Chairman of
the House Banking and Currency Committee, who noted in the floor debate
on the federal statute that "[t]his system of institutions will fill a most
desirable need in the credit world of a class of people who have suffered from
exorbitant and unjustifiable interest rates . . . of 42 percent plus.'1t 4s The
people to whom he was referring were those of small means, low-income wage
earners, 146 whose inability to secure credit from other financial institutions
forces them to borrow from loan sharks at usurious interest rates. 147 Today, it
is still difficult for lower-income groups to obtain credit from financial
institutions other than credit unions. "The credit union may literally be the
only place where a poor man can borrow.1 148 Loan companies and banks lend
primarily on the basis of objective criteria applied by professional loan
officers, who look to the educational background or continuous employment
of a potential borrower. The low-income wage earner can seldom meet these
prerequisites. 149 But at a credit union, where a loan committee composed of
peers judges the member on his ability to repay by taking both subjective and
objective factors into account, the low-income wage earner has a reasonable
chance of getting the loan. Iso Still, the low-income group cannot even borrow
a credit union's portfolio that may be allocated for ... long-term obligations." Id. at 9, U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 112. In accordance with this directive, the NCUA's final rule on real
estate limits "[tihe aggregate dollar amount of real estate loans outstanding [to] 25 per centum of
the Federal credit union's assets without prior written consent of the Administration." 43 Fed.
Reg. 14924, 14927 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6(b)(4)).
Thus, while credit unions can now make certain long-term loans, congressional restrictions on
this power are intended to ensure that credit unions maintain their traditional function of creating
a short-term source of credit for their members. Short-term loans, since they do not require the
same degree of account stability as do long-term investments, are not incompatible with the
establishment of share draft accounts. As a result, the historical functions of credit unions, unlike
savings banks, do not preclude the issuance of transaction accounts as an exercise of the
institution's incidental powers.
144. While the purpose clause does not expressly say that the source of credit is to be made
available only to credit union members, the loan provision in the statute indicates that this was
the intention of Congress: "A Federal credit union. . . shall have power. . . to make loans...
and extend lines of credit to its members, to other credit unions, and to credit union organizations
. . . ." Federal Credit Union Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, § 302(a), 91 Stat. 49
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5) (1976)). A loan to another credit union or to an organization of
credit unions, while it does not directly benefit the lender's members in the form of a larger source
of credit for them, does indirectly benefit the borrower's members by increasing the available
funds from which they might receive a loan.
145. 78 Cong. Rec. 12223 (1934).
146. Id.; S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
147. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
148. Low Income Credit Unions, supra note 27, at 236.
149. "The plain fact of the matter is that many banks consider the very poor to be very bad
credit risks. This drives the poor into the open, avaricious arms of loan sharks. . . ." 115 Cong.
Rec. 13997 (1969) (remarks of Senator Scott).
150. Low Income Credit Unions, supra note 27, at 235-36.
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from a credit union unless that credit union has an adequate credit base from
which to make the loans. Today, "[t]he basic [problem] of low income credit
unions remains paid-in capital. Without it there can be no loans made
... "151 The issuance of credit union share drafts, however, will help
alleviate this problem of deficient capital. These accounts, which can poten-
tially yield interest at a higher rate than comparable savings and demand
deposits at other institutions, will most likely prompt some credit union
members to transfer funds from their checking and savings accounts into
credit union share draft accounts. While this transfer will not be reflective of
any increase in the aggregate level of members' savings, 5 2 it will result in a
greater source of funds from which the credit union can make loans to its
members. 153
Undoubtedly, the creation of a source of credit remains an important
congressional objective for credit unions today, forty-four years after the
passage of the Federal Credit Union Act. In 1970, Congress acknowledged
this need to increase the existing credit base for credit unions by providing for
share account insurance for all credit unions and allowing nonmember
accounts for credit unions serving predominately low-income members.154
[Sjhare insurance... [will] provide additional funds for credit unions serving residents
in the inner city where it is difficult to attract deposits ...
[ * * S]hare insurance should also enable the average credit union to be more
competitive in attracting savings ....
[C]redit unions which are serving low-income persons need assistance in
attracting capital... [b]ecause those who are members have relatively little in savings
to deposit in their credit union . . . .In order to overcome this deficiency, it is
necessary for credit unions serving low-income persons to receive capital from outside
sources. 155
In sum, credit unions possess the implied power under the Federal Credit
Union Act to permit the use of share drafts as a reasonable method of
withdrawal from share accounts. 15 6 This power arises from the express power
to issue withdrawable share accounts.' 57 Moreover, the implied power to use
share drafts as a reasonable method of withdrawal from share accounts can be
inferred from the incidental powers clause for two reasons: 1) share drafts are
necessary to the exercise of the express power to receive payments on
151. Id. at 238.
152. See notes 131-42 supra and accompanying text.
153. There is little question that Congress intended the statutory purpose of providing a
source of credit to mean a source of lendable funds within the credit union, and not in the
economy in the aggregate. This view rests on the congressional belief that credit unions were
necessary since the "masses of the people" were unable to secure credit from most other financial
institutions, and, as a result, these people could be better assisted by an increase in credit union,
as opposed to aggregate, lendable funds. See S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934).
154. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-468, §§ 1, 10, 84 Stat. 994, 1017 (1970).
155. S. Rep. No. 1128, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970).
156. See notes 106-22 supra and accompanying text.
157. See notes 96-105 supra and accompanying text.
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withdrawable shares, 158 and 2) share drafts create a source of credit for credit
union members. 159
B. Power To Agree on the Terns of Withdrawal
In addition to its power to receive payments on withdrawable shares,' 60 a
credit union has the power to contract.' 6' Indeed, the purchase of shares by
the member creates a contractual relation between the credit union and
himself.16 2 The terms of that contract, as with any contract, are settled in
accordance with the agreement of the parties. 163 This freedom of contract, as
a principle of common law, is altered only if a statute, like the Federal Credit
Union Act, expresses a purpose to alter it.'"
One of the most important terms in a contractual relationship between a
financial institution and an account holder is the method of withdrawal. This
withdrawal term, like all other contractual terms, is subject to the agreement
of the parties. 165 Of course, Congress can expressly or impliedly limit this
158. See notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text.
159. See notes 144-55 supra and accompanying text.
160. See notes 82, 89 supra and accompanying text.
161. See 12 U.S.C. § 1757(1) (1976).
162. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
163. See note 165 infra and accompanying text.
164. Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1959); Isbrandtsen
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S.
426, 437 (1907).
165. This principle was recognized in People v. Binghamton Trust Co., 139 N.Y. 185, 34
N.E. 898 (1893), where the New York Court of Appeals held that a trust company that had
established interest-bearing accounts subject to withdrawal by written order or check had not
violated the banking law by receiving deposits as if it were a savings bank. Id. at 191-92, 34
N.E. at 900-01. The trust company, when it opened an account, issued a passbook containing
various "rules governing deposits," including a rule that all withdrawals must be made by written
order or check and that all withdrawals were subject to the trust company's right to a notice of
withdrawal. Id. at 187-88, 34 N.E. at 899. Although the trust company's powers under its
charter were not precisely in issue, the court, in discussing the power of the trust company and
the depositor to agree to these rules, remarked that it knew "of no principle of law which, as to
... the obligation to repay, moneys, denies the entire freedom to regulate them by such a contract as
the parties are willing to enter into." Id. at 189, 34 N.E. at 900 accord, Hajoca Corp. v. Security
Trust Co., 41 Del. 514, 521, 25 A.2d 378, 381 (Super. Ct. 1942); Magness v. Equitable Trust Co.,
176 Md. 528, 6 A.2d 241 (1939); State v. Crookston Trust Co., 203 Minn. 512, 515-16, 282 N.W.
138, 140 (1938); State v. Lincoln Trust Co., 144 Mo. 562, 592, 46 S.W. 593, 600 (1898); David v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 59 Misc. 2d 248, 249, 298 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (Sup. Ct. 1969);
9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 267, at 545-46 (1938).
The Supreme Court of Michigan has recognized that this same freedom of contract principle
applies to credit union share accounts. LaValley v. Pere Marquette Employes' Credit Union, 342
Mich. 639, 70 N.W.2d 798 (1955). The terms of the share account contract at issue included a
prohibition on the making of deposits or withdrawals by a member without presentation of the
passbook. Id. at 644-45, 70 N.W.2d at 800. In upholding the validity of this term, the court
remarked that the credit union and its member may contract as to the withdrawable nature of the
account "as they see fit." Id. at 646, 70 N.W.2d at 801; accord, Iowa Credit Union League v.
Iowa Dep't of Banking, CE 6-3152, slip op. at 16 (Iowa Dist. Ct. May 24, 1977) (share drafts are
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freedom of contract in the enabling statute. Thus Congress has expressly
prohibited federal savings and loan associations from issuing savings accounts
"subject to check or to withdrawal or transfer on negotiable or transferable
order or authorization to the association."' 16 6 On the other hand, Congress has
not placed any similar restriction on withdrawal from credit union share
accounts. In fact, the Federal Credit Union Act neither expressly proscribes
nor prescribes any methods of withdrawal. 167
Whether the federal statute impliedly proscribes freedom of contract with
respect to share account withdrawal methods is a more complex question. A
logical point of departure on this issue is the history of the Federal Credit
Union Act. As the legislative history indicates, Congress believed that the
most important credit union objective was the creation of a short-term credit
source for people of small means who had previously been largely unable to
borrow from other financial institutions. 68 Congress felt that this problem, if
left unresolved, would continue to result in usury and, as a consequence, the
destruction of the "buying power of the masses."'1 69 Because of the sig-
a proper exercise of a credit union's power to contract with respect to share account withdrawals);
Michigan Bankers' Ass'n Case, 16 (Fin. Inst. Bureau, Mich. Dep't of Commerce Mar. 17, 1977);
Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n Case, 9-10 (Okla. Credit Union lid. May 17, 1977); Position Paper on
Credit Union Share Draft Accounts, 2 (Ill. Dep't of Fin. Inst. Sept. 15, 1977).
Moreover, attorney general opinions in six states have concluded that the maintenance of share
draft programs by state credit unions is permissible. Letter from James A. Ostendorf, assistant
attorney general of Maryland, to William L. Wilson (Oct. 31, 1977) (experimental program
permissible if authorized in bylaws); Letter from Rufus L. Edmisten, attorney general of North
Carolina, to William L. Cole (Oct. 28, 1975) (state credit union administrator can authorize share
drafts in the bylaws); Letter from Donald A. Antrim, assistant attorney general of Ohio, to
Eugene Conkle (Aug. 2, 1976) (permissible withdrawal method); Texas Atty. Gen. Opinion No.
H-1084, at 21 (Nov. 3, 1977) (no specific statutory prohibition of share drafts); Letter from H.
Wright Volker, assistant attorney general of Utah, to W. S. Brimhall (Sept. 10, 1975) (permissible
if authorized in bylaws approved by state regulatory agency); Wash. AGLO 1977 No. 40 (Sept.
29, 1977) (program legal whereby member draws check on commercial bank that looks to
member's credit union share account for payment). Opinions rendered in two states, however,
have concluded that share draft programs are prohibited by explicit statutory provisions forbid-
ding the offering of checking accounts by credit unions. Ark. Atty. Gen. Opin. No. 76-111 (Aug.
18, 1976); 37 Mont. Atty. Gen. Opin. 86 (Nov. 10, 1977). In New Mexico, the attorney general
has decided that state credit unions are prohibited from offering share drafts because of the
absence of any express authority in their chartering statute Letter from Robert G. Gardenhire,
assistant attorney general of New Mexico, to Herbert H. Hughes (Dec. 8, 1976). The Oregon
attorney general concluded that the state credit union administrator could not authorize share
drafts pursuant to his power to restore competitive equality between state and federal credit
unions because, at the time, federal credit unions were merely operating under an experimental
share draft program. Letter from Lee Johnson, Oregon attorney general, to John D. Olin (Aug.
25, 1976). Finally, in a nonformal legal guideline, the Idaho attorney general decided that credit
unions are probably not authorized to offer NOW-type accounts. Letter from Rudy Barchas,
deputy attorney general of Idaho, to Tom McEldowney (Dec. 2, 1976).
166. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1976).
167. See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text.
169. S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (19341.
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nificance that Congress attached to this goal, it is suggested that any contrac-
tual term regarding a share account which undermined the achievement of
this source of credit would be impliedly proscribed by the federal statute. The
establishment of share draft accounts, however, is not inconsistent with the
maintenance of a short-term lending function.170 Indeed, share drafts promote
this function by creating a larger source of credit for members.' 7 ' As a result,
to the extent that share drafts do not undermine the maintenance of a
short-term lending function, these accounts would not seem to be implicitly
prohibited by the Federal Credit Union Act.
Still, the American Bankers Association, the plaintiff in American Bankers
Association v. Connell, 172 relying on recent congressional statements concern-
ing negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) account' 7 3 legislation in 1973,174
has argued that the federal statute impliedly prohibits a credit union from
issuing share draft accounts.' 7 5 The defendant, the NCUA, relied on the same
statements to show the congressional belief that no such impediment to the
offering of share drafts exists under the Act.' 76 In its decision on the share
draft issue, the court in American Bankers Association considered the infer-
ences drawn by the parties from the 1973 legislative history concerning NOW
accounts. 177 In view of this and the fact that the two types of accounts are
170. See note 143 supra.
171. See notes 150-53 supra and accompanying text.
172. No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978); see note 25 supra and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of NOW accounts, see notes 178-95 infra and accompanying text.
174. Act of Aug. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-100, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 342 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1832 (1976)).
175. Plaintiffs' Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of a Motion for Summary
Judgment at 22, American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978).
176. Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 31,
American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978). In essence, both parties
attempted to determine the intention of the Congress that had enacted the federal statute in 1934
by the use of congressional actions or statements made in subsequent legislative sessions. The
courts, however, have generally disfavored this practice. As the branch of government responsi-
ble for the interpretation of federal statutes, the federal courts have held, as a general rule, that in
determining the intention of a prior Congress, the legislative history of a subsequent bill is of little
persuasive significance. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 269 (1965).
This is so regardless of whether the subsequent bill is enacted or not. United States v. Wise, 370
U.S. 405, 411 (1962) (unenacted bill); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1947)
(unenacted bill); see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963)
(enacted bill). But see Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.4 (1968) (legislative history of a
proposed but unenacted amendment is not controlling, but may be pertinent in discerning intent
of a prior Congress). Moreover, even in the exceptional case, in which a court may consider the
history of a subsequent bill pertinent in discerning the intent of a prior Congress, the persuasive-
ness of the subsequent history varies inversely with the length of time between the two sessions.
See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968); Rainwater v. United
States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958).
177. No. 77-2102, slip op. at 6-8 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978). While Judge Robinson of the district
court considered these inferences in reaching his decision, he found them to be of "minimal
utility" in the share draft issue since neither position of the litigants was more persuasive than the
other. Id., slip op. at 6-8.
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practically similar, a brief discussion of the NOW legislation advances the
analysis of share draft accounts.
NOW accounts, which were pioneered in Massachusetts in the early 1970's,
are essentially interest-bearing savings accounts from which the depositor can
make withdrawals by means of negotiable or nonnegotiable drafts to himself
or a third party, subject to the institution's right to a notice of withdrawal. 178
NOW's are conceptually close to share drafts since both accounts, although
they are subject to a notice of withdrawal, are for all practical purposes
interest-bearing checking accounts. 179
Prior to the 1973 federal legislation, °8 0 savings accounts subject to with-
drawal by draft payable to a third person were illegal under regulations of the
Federal Reserve Board, 18 1 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),18 2
and Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). 183 These regulations effec-
tively prevented all federal commercial banks, FDIC-insured state commer-
cial banks, federal savings and loan associations, and insured state savings
and loan associations from offering NOW accounts. 184 As a result, the only
major depository institutions, besides credit unions,185 that could issue NOW
accounts were savings banks 186 that were not members of the Federal Reserve
178. Congress has defined NOW's as "an account where (1) payment of interest or dividends
may be made; (2) the depository institution may require the account holder to give notice of
intended withdrawal not less than 30 days before the withdrawal is made; and (3) the account
holder is allowed to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instrument or other similar
item for the purpose of making payments to third parties." S. Rep. No. 407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
18 (1977).
179. See pt. IV(C) infra.
180. Act of Aug. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-100, § 2, 87 Stat. 342 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1832
(1976)).
181. 12 C.F.R. § 217.5(c)(1) (1977). This section, which remains in effect today, does not
explicitly forbid third-party payments, but does so impliedly by allowing member banks to permit
withdrawals only by payment directly to the depositor except in a few cases, such as when a third
person presents the passbook along with the order of withdrawal. Id. As a result of the 1973
legislation, NOW accounts are explicitly exempted from the section's coverage. Id. § 217.5(c)(3).
182. With the exception of NOW accounts, withdrawal by draft is still prohibited by FDIC
regulations. Id. § 329.5(c)(1), (4). The provision is substantially the same as the Federal Reserve
Board regulation except that the FDIC regulations are inapplicable to "mutual savings banks or
to guaranty savings banks operating in the State of New Hampshire." Id. § 329.0.
183. "Savings accounts in a Federal association shall not be subject to check or to withdrawal
or transfer on negotiable or transferable order or authorization to the association." Id. §
545.4-1(a)(1). Since the enactment of the 1973 legislation, a limited exception to this rule exists In
favor of NOW accounts. Id. § 545.4-1(a)(3).
184. See (NOW) Account, supra note 79, at 478-82 & n.66.
185. Credit unions were not precluded from offering NOW accounts because there were no
explicit restrictions on the methods of withdrawal from a share account in the federal statute,
regulations, or bylaws. See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.
186. All savings banks are chartered under state law. S. Rep. No. 407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
24 (1977). Presently, savings bank chartering systems exist in 17 states, most of which are located
in the New England and Middle Atlantic states. D. Harless, Nonbank Financial Institutions 24
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System. 187 Massachusetts savings banks, largely unfettered by federal regula-
tion,1 88 led the NOW movement beainning in 1972 when a savings bank
sought and received a declaration in state court that NOW's were a permis-
sible method of withdrawal from savings accounts under Massachusetts
law. 189
Congressional reaction to the Massachusetts decision took the form of two
proposals: 1) the prohibition of NOW accounts in all fifty states, and 2) the
authorization for NOW's on a nationwide basis.190 The statute that was
eventually enacted in 1973 was a compromise in that every "depository
institution"1 91 was prohibited from offering NOW's in every state except
Massachusetts and New Hampshire. 192 The purpose behind the legislation 93
was to balance the noncompetitive situation which existed in those two New
England states as a result of the ability of savings banks in Massachusetts and
New Hampshire to offer NOW accounts while other depository institutions in
those states were precluded from doing so by federal regulations.194 Curi-
ously, however, credit unions were specifically excluded from the definition of
a "depository institution.' 9 5 The reason behind this deletion is not readily
(1975). Legislation has been proposed in Congress, however, to give savings banks in those 17
states the option of converting to a federal charter. See S. 2055. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402
(1977).
187. (NOW) Account, supra note 79, at 481-82.
188. Massachusetts savings banks escaped federal regulation in 1972 unless they were Federal
Reserve members. This was so, even if they were FDIC insured, because as mutual savings
banks they were not subject to FDIC regulations on insured nonmembers. 12 C.F.R. § 329.0
(1977).
189. Consumers Say. Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, 361 Mass. 717, 282 N.E.2d 416
(1972). This action was brought by Consumers Savings Bank against the state commissioner of
banks seeking a declaratory judgment reversing the commissioner's ruling preventing Consumers
from offering NOW accounts to its depositors. Id. at 717, 282 N.E.2d at 416. Massachusetts
banking law provided that savings bank deposits could be withdrawn in such manner as the
bank's bylaws permitted. Since Consumers' bylaws allowed withdrawals by "written instrument,"
the court concluded that Consumers was authorized to offer NOW accounts under Massachu-
setts banking law. Id. at 718-19, 282 N.E.2d at 417-18. As a result of this ruling, any
Massachusetts savings bank which had, or adopted, similar bylaws could also issue NOW
accounts. In September 1972, New Hampshire Savings Bank in Concord became the first
institution in New Hampshire to offer NOW accounts. S. Rep. No. 407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1977). New Hampshire savings banks that were FDIC insured were explicitly exempted from
that federal agency's prohibition of NOW-type accounts. See note 182 supra and accompanying
text.
190. S. Rep. No. 149, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1973] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2014, 2015.
191. The definition of a depository institution included national banks, state banks, state
savings and loan associations, savings banks, and federal savings and loan associations. 119
Cong. Rec. 28020 (1973).
192. Act of Aug. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-100, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 342 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1832 (1976)).
193. 119 Cong. Rec. 28074 (1973).
194. See notes 180-84 supra and accompanying text.
195. "The [conference committee] compromise also deletes credit unions from the definition of
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ascertainable from the legislative history of the bill. As a result, the parties in
American Bankers Association have drawn opposing inferences from this
exclusion and used them to support their respective positions on whether
share draft accounts are impliedly proscribed under the Federal Credit Union
Act. 196
The American Bankers Association took the position that Congress ex-
cluded credit unions from the definition of "depository institution" because it
did not want to extend the privilege of offering NOW accounts to those
organizations in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. 197 The Association
concluded, therefore, that Congress believed that without such a grant of
power credit unions were powerless to offer NOW's-and as a result, the
conceptually similar share drafts1 9 8-under the Federal Credit Union Act.
This position rested primarily on a statement made during the floor debate on
the bill by Representative Wright Patman that "all depository institutions
except credit unions [would] be permitted to offer NOW accounts in the two
States."1 99 The NCUA, however, drew the opposite inference from the
exclusion of credit unions; that is, that "Congress intended to let credit unions
use their already existing power to allow [INOW and share draft] with-
drawals. °2 00 This position appears more plausible than the bankers' argu-
ment, in light of the historical context of the NOW legislation. Prior to that
legislation, restrictive regulations precluded practically every federal and
state chartered bank and savings and loan association from offering NOW
accounts in the fifty states.20 1 Thus, in enacting the NOW bill, it would
appear more likely that Congress was removing these restrictive regulations
on the issuance of NOW accounts in Massachusetts and New Hampshire
rather than empowering banks and savings and loan associations to establish
NOW's in the two states.202 Accordingly, since no comparable rules had
a 'depository institution.' " H.R. Rep. No. 418, 93d Cong.. 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1973] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2025, 2025.
196. See notes 172-76 supra and accompanying text.
197. Plaintiffs' Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of a Motion for Summary
Judgment at 21-22, American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978).
198. See note 179 supra and accompanying text.
199. 119 Cong. Rec. 28074 (1973) (emphasis added).
200. Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 31,
American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978).
201. See notes 180-84 supra and accompanying text.
202. This interpretation is buttressed by the fact that if the bankers' position were correct,
then Congress, by granting powers to both federal and state chartered institutions, might be
acting unconstitutionally. The powers of state chartered institutions, which are delineated In state
chartering statutes, originate with the state legislatures. If Congress were to grant additional
powers to these institutions, then an argument might be made that the federal government was
infringing upon the powers reserved to the states under the tenth amendment ("The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.). This constitutional Issue
would be avoided if the congressional action is viewed as a removal of the regulatory restrictions,
since in this case Congress would be merely restoring the right to these state institutions to
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prevented federal credit unions from offering NOW's prior to the legisla-
tion,20 3 Congress saw no reason to include them in the bill's definition of
"depository institution."
Another "implied proscription" argument was advanced by the Indepen-
dent Bankers Association of America (IBAA) in support of the plaintiffs in
American Bankers Association. In its amicus curiae brief,2°4 the IBAA
contended that since the Senate was presently considering legislation that
would "permit... [credit union] account holders to maintain... share draft
accounts,120 S Congress must have believed that credit unions are implicitly
precluded by the federal statute from offering these accounts now. Credit
Union National Association (CUNA), 20 6 however, took the contrary position
that, despite the explicit language of the proposed Senate bill "permitting"
share drafts, the legislative history of that bill evinced the congressional
opinion that the bill simply recognized the existing credit union power under
the federal statute to issue these accounts. 20 7 Since the court in American
Bankers Association considered these inferences in its share draft decision, a
brief discussion of the parties' arguments would once again seem appropri-
ate.
208
The IBAA position rested upon a literal construction of the present Senate
bill "permitting" credit unions to offer share draft accounts. This position,
however, appears untenable in that courts are loath to draw the inference that
legislation which expressly authorizes certain powers necessarily implies the
absence of those powers before the legislation. 20 9 Moreover, the fact that the
NCUA has supported the present Senate bill "authorizing" share drafts is
irrelevant to the issue of whether credit unions are impliedly proscribed from
offering those accounts. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to draw
any inference from the fact that a federal agency like the NCUA petitions
Congress for a clarifying amendment to a vague statutory provision. 210
exercise their explicit and implicit powers under the state chartering statutes. They could then
offer NOW accounts so long as they were so empowered under their respective enabling statutes.
203. See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
204. Memorandum of Independent Bankers Association of America, Amicus Curiae, in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 21-22, American Bankers Ass'n v.
Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978).
205. S. 2055, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977) (emphasis added).
206. See note 16 supra.
207. Amicus Curiae Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of
IBAA at 12-13, American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978).
208. No. 77-2102, slip op. at 6-8 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978); see note 177 supra and accompany-
ing text.
209. See Franklin NaVI Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954). In this case, the Supremv
Court held that a legislative authorization for national banks to receive savings deposits, at a time
when many national banks had already been offering these accounts, should be interpreted as
"declaratory of the right of a national bank" not only to enter into, but also to continue, the
offering of savings accounts. Id. at 377.
210. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1968); Black v.




"Public policy requires that agencies feel free to ask [for] legislation which will
terminate or avoid adverse contentions and litigations. '21 1 Therefore, the fact
that the NCUA has not petitioned for, but has merely supported, the present
Senate bill can certainly lead to no inference that the Agency is admitting
"that it is acting upon a wrong construction '2 12 of the power of credit unions
to issue share drafts under the federal Act.
In opposition to the IBAA position, CUNA maintained that since the
Senate bill is merely for the purpose of regulating share draft accounts, and
not for the purpose of empowering credit unions to issue them, Congress has
manifested its belief that these accounts are presently authorized under the
federal statute. 21 3 The legislative history clearly supports this view. In
committee hearings on the bill, the NCUA Administrator called upon the
legislators to recognize that federal credit unions already possess the power to
issue share drafts under the federal statute. Therefore, the NCUA Adminis-
trator contended, the Senate bill does not provide credit unions with share
draft authority, but merely regulates the issuance and maintenance of those
accounts. 21 4 In recognizing this distinction between regulation and authoriza-
tion in its report, the Senate committee demonstrated its belief that share
drafts are not impliedly proscribed under the federal Act:
Title I authorizes federally chartered or insured commercial banks, savings and loan
associations, mutual savings ba.nks and credit unions to offer negotiable order of
withdrawal (NOW) accounts to individuals. In addition to authorizing credit unions to
offer NOW accounts, the bill prescribes that share draft accounts conform to the rules
and regulations prescribed for NOW accounts. 215
In conclusion, since there are no express or implied proscriptions on a credit
union's power to contract with its members on the terms of their share
account relationship, the parties are free to agree on share drafts as a method
of withdrawal from the accounts. In addition, both the power to receive
withdrawable shares and the incidental powers clause give rise to an implied
power to permit share drafts as a reasonable method of withdrawal. 2 16 For
these reasons, it is submitted that credit union share drafts are legal under the
Federal Credit Union Act. 21 7 Moreover, the existence of the power to permit
211. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47 (1950).
212. Id.
213. Amicus Curiae Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of
IBAA at 12-13, American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978).
214. NOW Accounts, Federal Reserve Membership and Related Issues: Hearings on
S.1664--S.1669, and S.1873 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comn.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
NOW Hearings] (statement of C. Austin Montgomery, NCUA Administrator).
215. S. Rep. No. 407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1977).
216. See pt. III(A) supra.
217. The question of whether federal credit unions possess the statutory power to offer share
draft accounts was recently addressed by the District Court for the District of Columbia.
American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978). This case, instituted by
the plaintiffs shortly after the NCUA promulgated its final share draft rule, was brought on the
ground that federal credit unions lacked the statutory authority to establish share draft accounts.
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share drafts under the federal Act renders untenable the American Bankers
Association's contention that the NCUA, in issuing the share draft regulation,
exceeded its statutory power to "prescribe rules and regulations for the
administration" 218 of the Act. 219
Id., slip op. at 1-3. Since no genuine issue of fact existed between the parties' positions, both the
bankers and the NCUA filed motions for summary judgment. Id., slip op. at 1. In holding that
the Federal Credit Union Act includes the power to issue share draft accounts, the court granted
the NCUA's motion. Id., slip op. at 5-6, 10.
The primary issue confronted by the court was whether federal credit unions were empowered
to permit their members to use share drafts as a means of accessing their share accounts. See id.,
slip op. at 3. At the outset, the court observed that "(i]t is uncontested that [federal credit unions]
possess the power to authorize and regulate withdrawals from share accounts." Id., slip op. at 4.
The source of this power, however, is not found within an express provision of the federal
statute. Id. Instead, this power impliedly arises from the statutory provision granting credit
unions authority to "exercise such incidental powers as shall be necessary or requisite to enable
[credit unions] to carry on effectively the business for which [they are] incorporated." Id. (quoting
12 U.S.C. § 1757(15) (1976)). The court went on to observe that the question of whether share
drafts are a valid exercise of this implied power to establish methods of withdrawal from share
accounts depends on the "relationship between share drafts and share accounts." Id., slip op. at 5
n.5. The district court, noting that share drafts simply constituted a variation on the traditional
methods of accessing share accounts, held that credit unions were empowered to authorize share
drafts as a method of withdrawal. "Share drafts are simply a variation on established methods of
accessing members [sic] accounts, similar to previous procedures for credit union third-party
payments, and similarly valid as part of the exercise of [federal credit unions'] incidental powers
under the [federal statute]. To rule otherwise would be to raise form over substance, to deny the
history of the use of drafts in commercial practice, and to unreasonably limit the undisputed
power of [federal credit unions] to honor and regulate share account withdrawals." Id., slip op. at
5-6 (footnote omitted).
218. 12 U.S.C. § 1766(a) (1976).
219. The bankers' claim that the NCUA exceeded its authority is made under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976). That Act provides for the judicial
review of administrative action, id. § 704, and mandates that if a reviewing court should find an
agency's action to be in excess of authority it shall "hold unlawful and set aside [the] agency
action . ..," id. § 706(2). There is no right of review, however, in two cases: when the statute
governing the agency precludes review and when the "agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." Id. § 701(a)(2). An administrative regulation which exceeds the statutory power
to prescribe rules and regulations for the administration of a federal statute -is a mere nullity."
Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936); see Investment Co. Inst.
v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 639 (1971). In American Bankers the plaintiff's argument hinges on the
absence of the power of federal credit unions to issue share drafts under the Act. Since credit
unions possess this power under the federal statute, the promulgation of the NCUA regulation
falls within the statutory authority of the Agency to administer the Federal Credit Union Act.
Moreover, the bankers have claimed that the NCUA regulation on share drafts was arbitrary
and capricious. See No. 77-2102, slip op. at 3, 9-10 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978). The Administrative
Procedure Act requires that a court set aside an administrative action on review if it finds that
action to be "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1976). Such
a decision by the reviewing court necessitates a finding that the agency's action was not based on
a consideration of the relevant factors and that there was a clear error in judgment. Citizens To
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of
Administrative Action 182 (1965). In the case of share drafts, the NCUA regulation would not
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IV. SHARE DRAFTS AND THE FEDERAL POLICY AGAINST INTEREST-
BEARING DEMAND DEPOSITS
Share draft and NOW accounts, as third-party transaction accounts, are for
all practical purposes interest-bearing checking accounts. 220 Federal policy,
however, is unmistakably opposed to an interest-bearing account from which
checks can be drawn. 22' This fact raises a number of issues: (1) Does the
federal policy cover credit unions?; (2) Are share drafts demand deposits?; (3)
Whether or not they are demand deposits, do share drafts fall within the spirit
of this policy; and (4) If they do come within the policy's purpose, should the
prohibition on interest-bearing demand deposits be explicitly enlarged to
cover share drafts, or should the policy's application to other financial
institutions be reexamined?
The federal policy against interest-bearing demand deposits has existed
since 1933, when it was included as a provision in the Glass-Steagall Act. 222
The provision reads: "No member bank shall, directly or indirectly, by any
device whatsoever, pay any interest on any deposit which is payable on
demand. ' 223 This prohibition was clearly included in the 1933 Act to promote
the stability of the banking industry. 224 In the 1920's and, especially in the
early 1930's, the banking industry had experienced an inordinate number of
failures. 225 At the time of the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, the prevail-
ing theory explaining these failures was that they had been caused by
excessive interest rate competition over demand deposit funds. 226 Such corn-
seem to be arbitrary or capricious since it was based on a consideration of the relevant factors in
the share draft issue-the pertinent legal issues, the effect of share drafts on the competitive
balance among financial institutions, and the congressional mandate that the NCUA be more
responsive to the needs of credit union members in an "evolving socio/economic environment." 42
Fed. Reg. 61977, 61978-79 (1977).
220. Indeed, advertisements for the accounts have often characterized them as Interest-
bearing checking accounts. 121 Cong. Rec. 34558 (remarks of Representative Johnson) (NOW
accounts); see Statement of William H. Smith, American Bankers Association, Before The
National Credit Union Administration on the Proposed Share Draft Rule 12 C.F.R. § 701.34, at
10 (Apr. 19, 1977) (share draft accounts).
221. See notes 235-36 infra and accompanying text.
222. Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 181 (1933).
223. 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976).
224. (NOW) Account, supra note 79, at 475. "[Tjhe survival of banks [was elevated In 1933]
to a public policy position of first priority.... Bank failures were one of the most visible symbols
of the economic collapse, and their avoidance in the future was an objective of overriding
importance .... [This objective] was given legislative recognition... by an absolute prohibition
of interest on demand deposits . . . " Golembe Assocs., Inc., Memorandum re: Banking
Reform-Once Over Lightly, Vol. 1976-2 Golembe Reports 2.
225. American Institute of Banking, Federal Regulation of Banking 54 (1975); see Higgins,
Interest Payments on Demand Deposits: Historical Evolution and The Current Controversy, Fed.
Res. Bank of Kansas City Monthly Rev., July-Aug. 1977, at 3-4 [hereinafter cited as Demand
Deposits]. During March 1933, in the midst of the worst banking crisis in the nation's history,
over 4,500 bank failures were recorded. A. Cox, Regulation of Interest Rates on Bank Deposits
21 & n.67 (1966).
226. NOW Hearings, supra note 214, at 6; Demand Deposits, supra note 225, at 4.
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petition had forced interest rates up to such a height that banks were
compelled to engage in risky investments and lower their deposit reserves to
precarious levels in order to earn a return on demand deposits. 227 Accord-
ingly, it was believed that an absolute prohibition on the payment of interest
on demand deposits would further bank security. Moreover, bank instability
was exacerbated by the practice of many rural banks of depositing their liquid
funds in interest-bearing demand deposits at large city banks during the
periods of the year when agricultural loan demand was 1ow. 2 n The city banks
often invested those funds in high-yielding risky assets, including call loans to
security market investors. 229 When the seasonal demands for agricultural
credit coincided with downturns in the economy and stock markets, the large
city banks were often unable to call the loans collateralized by stock in order to
meet the withdrawal demands of the country banks.230 As a result, bank
stability was further jeopardized.
Undoubtedly, the excessive interest rate competition theory must have
weighed heavily in the congressional decision to prohibit interest-bearing
demand deposits in 1933. Whether the validity of that theory, however, was
ever established by Congress is another question. The legislative history sheds
little light on an answer to this question since there were no hearings held on
the prohibition 231 and there was no debate on the committee reports recom-
mending passage of the bill. 232 This has prompted one commentator to
observe that the legislation may have been hastily enacted by Congress, as a
reaction to the prevailing bank crisis, without a careful consideration of the
prohibition's merits. 233 Thus, while the purpose behind the policy against
227. American Institute of Banking, Federal Regulation of Banking 54 (1975); Demand
Deposits, supra note 225, at 4; Prochnow, Time Deposit Banking, 82 Banking LJ. 941, 944
(1965); (NOW) Account, supra note 79, at 475.
228. A Study of the Staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The
Impact of the Payment of Interest on Demand Deposits 9-10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Interest
Impact]. This concern had been voiced as early as 1873 when William Richardson, the Secretary
of Treasury, cautioned against the deleterious effects of paying interest on demand deposits.
"There can be no doubt that the practice by banks of allowing interest on deposits payable on
demand is pernicious.. . . [I]f deposit accounts are employed as temporary investments, the
interest attracts a large amount of money to those cities where such interest is paid, and where
speculation is most active, at seasons when as much profit thereon cannot be secured elsewhere."
Annual Report, Secretary of Treasury (Dec. 1, 1873), reprinted in Federal Banking Laws and
Reports 1780-1912, at 409 (1963).
229. Demand Deposits, supra note 225, at 4.
230. Id.
231. Interest Impact, supra note 228, at 9.
232. A. Cox, Regulation of Interest Rates on Bank Deposits 24 (1966). The 1933 Act was not
accompanied by a voluminous legislative history. Interest Impact, supra note 228, at 9. More-
over, from the brief history that does exist, it appears that the interest prohibition received very
little attention since it was clearly overshadowed by the provisions establishing federal deposit
insurance, see 12 U.S.C. § 1814 (1976), and separating commercial and investment banking, see
id. §§ 24 Seventh, 378.
233. A. Cox, Regulation of Interest Rates on Bank Deposits 21-25 (1966). In 1932, both the
House and the Senate considered bills that limited the rate of interest on both demand and
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interest-bearing demand deposits is relatively clear-to promote bank
security-it is possible that this prohibition may have been enacted on the
basis of a theory that was unsubstantiated.2 3
4
A. Credit Unions and the Federal Policy
Given the Glass-Steagall Act's policy on interest-bearing demand deposits,
the first question to be resolved is whether credit unions are covered by this
prohibition. It is submitted that credit unions are not subject to the prohibi-
tion because, although it has been expressly applied to other financial institu-
tions, credit unions have never come explicitly within its purview. The first
institutions to be covered by the policy were the Federal Reserve member
banks in 1933.235 Two years later this group was enlarged when the prohibi-
tion was applied to all FDIC-insured banks. 236 However, the Federal Credit
Union Act, enacted in 1934 in the midst of the concern over the pernicious
impact of interest-bearing demand deposits, did not include a provision
prohibiting interest on any type of account. 237 Indeed, the only reference in
savings deposits. The ceiling rate for both types of deposits was set at 3Y/% in the Senate and 4%
in the House. Id. at 21. The Senate bill was passed in January of 1933, but time limitations
precluded its consideration by the House before the end of the Seventy-second Congress on March
4th of that year. Id. During the month of March 1933, in the midst of the nation's worst banking
crisis, over 4,500 bank failures were recorded. Id. at 21 & n.67. This prompted President
Roosevelt to declare the well-known "Bank Holiday" on March 6th. Id. at z.'22. After the
Congress reconvened, the final version of the bill that had passed the Senate in January was
reintroduced with two radical changes as a response to the banking crisis: the prohibition of
interest on demand deposits and the deposit insurance provision. Id. at 22. While considerable
time was spent debating the deposit insurance section, the bill passed both houses in less than a
month after its introduction with nearly no deliberation on the interest prohibition provision. Id.
at 24.
234. See notes 271-74 infra and accompanying text.
235. Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 181 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976)). All
national banks must become members of the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1976). State
chartered banks may become members. Id. § 321. Likewise, a savings bank may become a
member. Id. § 333.
236. Act of Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 702 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g)
(1976)). The pervasiveness of the interest prohibition is evidenced by the fact that of the 14,194
national and state commercial banks in the United States at the end of 1973, only 218 were
noninsured. Similarly, only 160 of the 482 mutual savings banks were noninsured. J. White,
Banking Law 715 (1976).
237. Similarly, the prohibition which does exist for Federal Reserve members and FDIC-
insured banks should not be read into the Federal Credit Union Act. In North Arlington National
Bank v. Kearney Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, the Third Circuit indicated that the explicit policy
limiting the establishment of national bank branches under the National Banking Act should not
be read into the chartering statute for federal savings and loan associations since the policy
considerations underlying the limitation on bank branching were not applicable to federal savings
and loan associations. 187 F.2d 564, 567 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951); accord,
United States v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 151 F. Supp. 690, 697-98 (E.D. Wis.), modified
on other grounds, 248 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958). In the federal
share draft case, Credit Union National Association has contended that the policy prohibiting
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the statute to the payment df interest specifically provides that the board of
directors of a credit union may declare a "dividend" at "such intervals as the
board of directors may authorize... pursuant to such regulations as may be
issued by the Administrator . "..."238 Pursuant to this power, the NCUA
Administrator has placed a seven-percent ceiling on interest payments.
239
B. Share Drafts and Demand Deposits
All credit union share draft accounts, as share accounts, are subject to the
organization's right to a 60-day notice of withdrawal2 40 which cannot be
waived. 24 1 As a result, credit union share draft accounts are not demand
deposits. 242 Moreover, even the repeal243 of the bylaw provision which grants
this right to a 60-day notice would not provide credit unions with the
opportunity to issue demand deposits. This is because federal credit unions
have no power to issue deposits under the Federal Credit Union Act at all. 24
A deposit, such as a savings or checking account at a commercial bank,
creates a debtor-creditor relationship between the institution and the account
holder. Credit unions only have the power to issue share accounts, share draft
accounts, and share certificate accounts. These accounts, which are more
closely akin to equity than debt, result merely in a contractual relationship
between the member and the credit union.
245
interest-bearing demand deposits should not restrict credit unions under the Federal Credit Union
Act since that prohibition was adopted to prevent the pernicious effects resulting more from
interest payments on commercial and interbank deposits than on individual accounts. Thus, the
reasons underlying this policy are not applicable to the share accounts held by individual credit
union members. Amicus Curiae Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum of IBAA at 7-8, American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7,
1978).
238. Federal Credit Union Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, § 310, 91 Stat. S3
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1763 (1976)).
239. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
240. Standard Federal Credit Union Bylaws art. III, § 5(a).
241. 42 Fed. Reg. 11247, 11248 (1977).
242. See notes 77-81 supra and accompanying text.
243. Repeal of a bylaw can be accomplished by the approval of the NCUA Administrator
after a two-thirds affirmative vote of the credit union's board of directors. See Standard Federal
Credit Union Bylaws art. XXI. It is highly doubtful, however, that the Administrator would
approve a repeal of the bylaw provision granting credit unions the right to 60-day notice of
withdrawal. The NCUA has indicated its extreme reluctance to erode the distinction between
share accounts and demand deposits. For instance, the NCUA regulation on share drafts
prohibits the "blanket guarantee" of a share draft since this "necessarily waives the right to
require notice, an important distinction between the share draft account concept and a demand
deposit account." 42 Fed. Reg. 61977, 61982 (1977).
244. Federal credit unions only have power to receive payments on shares and share
certificates. Federal Credit Union Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, § 303(a), 91 Stat.
51 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1757(6) (1976)). In addition, credit unions possess the implied power to
offer share draft accounts to their members. See pt. II supra. Many state credit unions, however,
do have the power to receive deposits. See CUNA Governmental Affairs Division, Credit Union
National Association, Comparative Digest of Credit Union Acts 40 (1977 ed.).
245. See notes 84-93 supra and accompanying text.
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C. Share Drafts and the Purpose Behind the Policy
While share draft accounts are not explicitly covered by the federal prohibi-
tion, they may nonetheless fall within the spirit of that policy. As has been
noted, share draft and NOW accounts, while not technically demand ac-
counts because of the right to notice of withdrawal, are for all practical
purposes payable on demand. 246 This is because credit unions and other
financial institutions rarely invoke the right to notice of withdrawal. 247 It is
submitted that the reason for this reluctance is that many of these institutions
fear that a weakening in their competitive positions would result if they were
to require notice of withdrawal from an account since many depositors might
transfer their accounts to other institutions where their funds would not be so
encumbered.
Since share drafts are in effect demand accounts, it seems that they may fall
within the spirit of the federal policy. The purpose behind that policy was to
promote bank security by prohibiting the payment of interest on accounts
subject to withdrawal on demand. 248 The stability of credit unions might
likewise be enhanced if they were not permitted to pay "dividends" on share
draft accounts. 249 The balances in those accounts, which are practically
withdrawable on demand, could then be placed in more liquid and secure,
albeit lower-yielding, investments and loans, which would still earn money
for the credit union. This increased security for credit unions, however, would
not be comparable to that effected for banks by the interest prohibition for at
least three reasons. First, credit unions could always invoke the right to notice
in an emergency cash shortage situation. Second, unlike commercial banks,
credit unions are not obligated to pay any interest on share draft accounts.250
Any bad debts, therefore, associated with the investment in risky assets would
first be reflected in the nonpayment of interest since credit unions are
precluded from paying interest on any account unless their earnings exceed
the required reserves. Finally, the interest prohibition's extension to credit
unions would result in higher account carrying costs for credit unions since
members would find it economically sound to open separate share draft
accounts rather than drawing share drafts directly against their already
246. See note 220 supra and accompanying text.
247. Amicus Curiae Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of
IBAA at 5, American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978). For
instance, this right to notice of withdrawal has seldom been invoked during the long history of
Massachusetts savings banks. (NOW) Account, supra note 79, at 486-87.
248. See note 224 supra and accompanying text.
249. A similar concern over the deleterious effects of interest-bearing NOW accounts on bank
security was voiced during the floor debate on the 1973 law that permitted such accounts In
Massachusetts and New Hampshire. "I have come to the conclusion that I have no objection to
permitting savings banks to provide checking accounts to their customers. The payment of
interest on the balances of these accounts, however, trouble (sic] me .... [I1f more and more of
the savings banks' assets are committed to the NOW accounts, I am not sure banks could
continue paying as much as 4 percent or more, as some of them are doing without running Into
problems." 119 Cong. Rec. 15007 (1973) (remarks of Representative Cleveland).
250. See notes 138-39 supra and accompanying text.
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existing share accounts. 25 1 In this way, the member could still receive interest
on the funds left in the share account not subject to withdrawal by share
drafts.
D. Share Drafts and the Interest Prohibition
On the other hand, if it is granted that share drafts arguably fall within the
spirit of the federal policy against interest-bearing demand deposits, the
question then becomes whether that policy should be extended to encompass
credit unions or whether the application of the interest prohibition to other
financial institutions should be reconsidered. In opposing the establishment of
share draft accounts by credit unions, the American Bankers Association has
argued that these accounts, because of their interest-earning capability, have
a competitive advantage over checking accounts in the attraction of deposit
funds. 2S2 This "competitive inequity" between the two institutions, however,
is mitigated by certain bank practices which effectively allow them to
circumvent the prohibition on interest-bearing checking accounts. Although
that prohibition applies to the payment of interest both "directly or indi-
rectly, '25 3 the proscription on indirect payments has not been strictly en-
forced. As a result, banks have increasingly utilized indirect methods. "The
prohibition on the payment of interest on demand deposits enacted in the
1930's did not actually end such payments; rather it changed their form."25
Instead of earning explicit interest on his account as a credit union member
does, a bank depositor earns "implicit interest. "2ss For example, in the case of
individual depositors, banks have provided implicit interest by not charging
any service fees on checking accounts or by charging an amount beneath
actual bank cost.256 The implicit interest rate in such a case would be the
251. The proposed share draft regulation required that a credit union member open a
separate account for his share draft withdrawals. 42 Fed. Reg. 11247 (1977). During the comment
period, many interested parties pointed out that allowing the member to write share drafts
against his regular share account would reduce costs for the credit unions. Id. at 61980. The
NCUA accordingly modified this provision in its final regulation to permit members to draw
drafts against either their regular or separate share accounts, depending on the agreement reached
between the members and their credit union. Id.
252. Plaintiffs' Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of a Motion for Summary
Judgment at 19, American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978);
Plaintiffs' Brief in Reply to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, American Bankers
Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1978). This advantage is magnified by the fact
that a credit union member can earn up to 7% interest on his account without maintaining a
minimum balance greater than five dollars. See Standard Federal Credit Union Bylaws arts. I,
§ 3, XIV, § 2.
253. 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976).
254. NOW Hearings, supra note 214, at 32 (statement of Dr. Arthur F. Burns).
255. One commentator contends that the payment of implicit interest on demand deposits has
become an increasingly necessary competitive measure for banks in the last 15 years as the
general level of interest rates has risen, and as investors have become more attentive to the return
they earn on their assets. Demand Deposits, supra note 225, at S.
256. NOW Hearings, supra note 214, at 32 (statement of Dr. Arthur F. Burns). Other services
that banks provide at less than cost include portfolio investment analysis, tax advice, credit
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difference between the actual service charge and the actual cost of the
services. 25 7 Similarly, banks pay interest indirectly by offering gifts to new
depositors and by providing convenient banking locations and hours for
customer use. 258 To attract commercial depositors, banks also circumvent the
prohibition on interest by providing services for free or at a subsidized rate.
For example, a bank can provide the business with a lock-box, which is
essentially a bank depository into which the accounts receivable of the
business can be paid. 259 This process expedites the receipt of cash by the
business and thereby increases the time during which the business can earn an
explicit return on the money. Zero balance accounts also provide businesses
with implicit interest. Under this method of circumventing the interest
prohibition, the depositor maintains a regular account, in which a balance
must be maintained on the average, and a zero balance account. The
depositor draws checks on the account with no balance, and at the end of the
day the bank covers these checks by transferring funds from the regular
account or from the customer's money market assets which are maintained at
the bank. By not requiring funds in the account until the check clears, the
bank effectively permits the business to earn explicit interest on the cash
which would normally be tied up in a checking account. 260
Federal regulatory agencies have facilitated this trend of circumventing the
policy against interest-bearing demand deposits by promoting Electronic
Funds Transfer Systems (EFTS), which, in essence, provide for the transfer
of funds held in bank account balances by means of electronic devices. 26 1
information, and wire transfer facilities. Prochnow, Time Deposit Banking, 82 Banking L.J. 941,
946 (1965).
257. Interest Impact, supra note 228, at 19. Thus, if the actual service charge worked out to
be 4% on the average checking account balance, and the service charges only amounted to 2%,
the implicit interest rate would be 2%. The Federal Reserve study estimates that implicit interest
rates amount to approximately 4% at small- and medium-size banks, and 4.7% at large banks
(total deposits over $200 million). Id. at 19-21. These rates are even more attractive in that they
are not subject to income taxation as explicit interest rates are. Demand Deposits, supra note 225,
at 9. Whether it is more advantageous to receive interest implicitly or explicitly depends on an
individual's marginal tax rate. Id. at 10. For example, for an individual in a 50% marginal tax
bracket, the receipt of implicit interest of 4% in a bank checking account would be preferable to
the explicit return he could earn in a share draft account because, even assuming that the credit
union paid the maximum 7% rate, he would only get a 3.5% after-tax return on the credit union
account.
258. Interest Impact, supra note 228, at 19; Demand Deposits, supra note 225, at 5,
259. Interest Impact, supra note 228, at 23.
260. Id. & n.3. Payable-through-drafts drawn by the bank customer on himself similarly
provide businesses with implicit interest. These drafts can be utilized to increase the time between
the drawing of the draft and its actual payment by the bank because, unlike checks, payable-
through-drafts cannot be paid by the bank until the customer approves. This delay can be further
magnified by clearing the draft through a distant "payable through bank." To the extent that the
delay is increased by the use of payable-through-drafts, the bank customer can earn interest by
maintaining the requisite balances for the payment of those drafts in an interest-earning asset, Id.
261. See Brandel, Commercial and Consumer Law Aspects, reprinted in Practicing Law
Institute, Electronic Fund Transfers 253, 255 (1977); Brandel & Gresham, Electronic Funds
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Bank customers now have the right to transfer funds from a savings account
to a demand deposit by a mere telephone call, and thus maximize the explicit
interest return on their combined deposits. 262 Both savings and loan custom-
ers and bank depositors have the ability to authorize the association, by
telephone or otherwise, to pay a third person from the customer's savings
account on a periodic or nonrecurring basis. This payment can be made
directly to the third party, or if so authorized by the third party, can be made
into his account.263 Some savings and loan institutions have even placed
remote-service units in retail establishments, so that a depositor shopping in
the store can make deposits to, or withdrawals from, his savings account. 264
Since a withdrawal can then be used to pay the merchant for goods, the
savings account becomes, in effect, an interest-bearing checking account.
Finally, the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC have issued rules that
will permit all insured banks to transfer funds automatically from an individ-
ual's savings account to his checking account if the depositor's check over-
draws his checking account. 265 If such a transfer is made, the regulations do
not require the banks to impose a penalty in the form of an interest
forfeiture. 266 These rules appear to come the closest of any of the agency-
promulgated methods to creating interest-bearing demand deposits.
The competitive situation, therefore, between banks and credit unions with
regard to transaction accounts is not as inequitable as it might first appear
because banks have been successful in providing indirect interest payments to
their depositors, in spite of the clear statutory prohibition on the payment of
interest "by any device whatsoever. " 267 Thus, the competitive edge that credit
unions enjoy in issuing share draft accounts is reduced primarily to that of
Transfer: The Role of the Federal Government, 25 Cath. U.L. Rev. 705, 705 (1976); Note, The
Effect of the Use of Customer-Bank Communications Terminals on Competition Among Financial
Institutions, 45 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 591, 591 (1976). See generally Symposium-Electronic Funds
Transfer, 35 Md. L. Rev. 3 (1975); Symposium-A Primer on Electronic Funds Transfer Systems,
37 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 613 (1976).
262. See 12 C.F.R. § 217.152 (1977).
263. See id. § 545.4-1(a)(1) (savings and loan associations); id. § 217.5(c)(l)(vii) (member
banks of the Federal Reserve System); id. § 329.5(c)(1)(vi) (FDIC-insured banks).
264. Id. § 545.4-2(b)(1). Permission for remote-service units has been granted on an experi-
mental basis and is due to expire on June 30, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 9790 (1978). In its place, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board has proposed a permanent rule governing remote-service units.
Id. at 7327. The legality of the remote-service units is presently being challenged by the
Independent Bankers Association of America. Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, No. 76-0105 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 19, 1976); see Memorandum of
Independent Bankers Ass'n of America, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 5 n.6, American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, No. 77-2102 (D.D.C. Mar. 7,
1978).
265. 43 Fed. Reg. 20001 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 217.5(c)(2)) (Federal Reserve
member banks); id. at 20222 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 329.5(c)(2)) (FDIC-insured banks).
266. Id. at 20002, 20223.
267. 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976).
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convenience. Through the practices mentioned above, bank customers can
effect earning results comparable to those achieved by credit union members.
A credit union member can pay his bills to third parties by drawing a draft
directly against an interest-earning share draft account. A bank customer
generally cannot, since his drafts or checks are written against a non-
interest-bearing checking account. 268 But by transferring his funds from his
savings account to his checking account when he is ready to pay third parties,
he can bring about the same result. Of course, the bank customer is required
to telephone his bank within the hours established for such calls in order to
effect a fund transfer. Hence, it is a little more inconvenient for him to pay
third parties than it is for the credit union member who can accomplish the
same result directly from his share draft account. On the other hand, the
transfer from a savings to a checking account may result in a higher interest
return to the bank customer. For while savings deposits usually earn interest
from the day of deposit to the day of withdrawal, share draft accounts can
only receive interest on those funds that arc! on balance at the end of an
interest period, typically a quarter. 269
Since the competitive advantage of share draft accounts over checking
deposits in the attraction of deposit funds appears negligible, if not nonexis-
tent, it is clearly unnecessary to extend the interest prohibition to share drafts.
Still, the question remains whether the policy prohibiting interest-bearing
demand deposits should continue to be applied to other financial institutions.
It is submitted that it is time for a reexamination of the policy, with a view
towards its gradual elimination.
It is questionable, first of all, whether the policy was ever warranted.
Congressional records indicate that the prohibition was enacted hastily, as a
response to the banking crisis, and without substantiation of the theory which
engendered it-that interest rate competition undermined the stability of
banks. 270 As a result, many commentators and government officials 271 are
now calling for a repeal of the prohibition on the ground that the theory
268. Of course, a limited exception to this fact exists in New England where it is now possible
for depositors to draw a negotiable order of withdrawal directly against their savings accounts.
See notes 191-92 supra and accompanying text. The original legislative authorization for NOW
accounts only covered Massachusetts and New Hampshire. See Act of Aug. 16, 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-100, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 342 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1976)). This group was enlarged
in 1976 to include Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See Act of Feb. 27, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 2, 90 Stat. 197 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1976)).
269. See notes 141-42 supra and accompanying text.
270. See notes 231-34 supra and accompanying text.
271. The Staff of the Federal Reserve Board has concluded that the interest rate competition
theory "appear[s] to have had little validity at the time the prohibition was enacted." Interest
Impact, supra note 228, at 14. In support of this conclusion, the staff cited studies by Albert Cox
and George Benston on the question of whether interest rate competition caused bank instability
in the early 1930's. Id. at 12-13. While Cox found no support for the theory, Benston discovered a




which lay behind it has either been disproved2 72 or never been proved, 73 or
that the prohibition is a distortion of free markets. 27 4
Even assuming, however, that the theory was valid in 1933, the prohibi-
tion against interest-bearing demand deposits would no longer appear neces-
sary to protect the security of banks because of the existence of alternative
methods to accomplish this objective.2 75 The 1933 Act recognized the avail-
ability of alternative methods since it utilized deposit insurance 27 6 and reserve
requirements 277 in addition to the prohibition on interest. Deposit insurance,
since it insures depositors against the possibility of bank failures, promotes the
security of customer deposits more than the security of banks. But reserve
requirements can promote bank stability by requiring the institutions to set
aside a certain percentage of their customers' deposits in order that the
demand for withdrawals from checking accounts can be met under normal
circumstances.
Reserve requirements might be an adequate guarantee of bank stability by
themselves.2 7 8 If not, measures other than an interest prohibition can be
utilized. For one, banks themselves could take the steps appropriate to
ensuring stability. If the interest prohibition were repealed, banks could still
make interest-bearing checking accounts profitable without resorting to in-
vestment in high-yielding assets. Banks could, for example, levy service
charges on the accounts in order to reduce the explicit interest cost. 2 9 This
272. NOW Hearings, supra note 214, at 99 (statement of George A. LeMaistre, Chairman,
FDIC); American Institute of Banking, Federal Regulation of Banking 54 (197S).
273. NOW Hearings, supra note 214, at 11 (statement of W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary
of the Treasury).
274. The Federal Reserve After 50 Years: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Domestic
Finance of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1135 (1964)
(statement of Professor Milton Friedman).
275. Moreover, one report argues that the objective of bank stability should be deemphasized
today. In 1933 it attained a preeminent public policy position because of the inordinate number of
bank failures. Today, it should-take its place along with other equally important public policies,
such as improved competition, greater disclosure, and enhanced market influence upon banks.
Golembe Assocs., Inc., Memorandum re: Banking Reform-Once Over Lightly, Vol. 19762
Golembe Reports 5.
276. See 12 U.S.C. § 1814 (1976).
277. See id. § 461. The imposition of reserve requirements against deposit liabilities of banks
was primarily intended in 1933 to ensure bank liquidity. The requirements have recently taken on
more importance as a monetary policy tool since "increases in the level of required reserves
restrict bank lending and the amount of deposits banks can create [and) [rleducions in reserve
requirements produce less restrictive monetary conditions." Report of the President's Commission
on Financial Structure and Regulation 66 (1971), reprinted in J. White, Banking Law 167 (1976).
278. This position was taken by the proponents of a recent banking act, Public Law 94-200,
which had originally included, when proposed, a provision permitting NOW accounts to be
offered on a nationwide basis. "We have also included in this bill a requirement for those
financial institutions who offer NOW accounts.., to provide appropriate reserves so that the
NOW account will not become a source of financial instability. We did not have these protective
provisions in the 1930's." 121 Cong. Rec. 34560 (1975) (remarks of Representative Rousselot).
279. This has become a prevalent means of protecting security among the New England
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seems to be a preferable way of maintaining bank security in that, unlike the
interest prohibition, it does not result in a distorted allocation of the cost of
bank services among customers. 280 In addition, the imposition of activity fees
will result in a more "efficient allocation of resources" 28 ' since bank customers
will refrain from the wasteful use of checks and other banking services.
Similarly, the substitution of service charges for the prohibition of interest will
permit more freedom of choice for the depositor in deciding how to spend his
interest. 282 "[T]he consumer is able to weigh the personal value of a service
against its actual price and make a more informed choice .... At present, the
consumer can only effectively 'spend' his 'interest' on whatever free services or
gifts are offered by the depository institution. '
283
Banks could also reduce the explicit interest cost of demand deposits by
introducing the truncated system that credit unions have pioneered for share
drafts. Under this system, when the share draft arrives at the "payable
through bank" for collection, the bank transfers the relevant data onto an
electronic medium and communicates via the medium with the credit
union. 284 The credit union member does not receive the draft back. His
ability to reconcile his account statement is not impaired, however, since each
time he writes out a draft, a copy is automatically made by a carbonless
duplicate. 28 . Since each check presently costs approximately twenty cents to
process, 28 6 this system could result in significant savings.
institutions offering NOW accounts. Many of them are imposing service charges and minimum
balance requirements in order to make the accounts profitable. Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1977, at 12,
col. 1. This same reasoning prompted the NCUA Administrator in his final regulation to allow
credit unions to charge activity fees on share draft accounts. The proposed regulation had
prohibited any activity fees. See 42 Fed. Reg. 61977, 61980 (1977).
280. If explicit interest is permitted on demand deposits, the "existing inequities whereby
some depositors subsidize the expense of servicing others' accounts will be eliminated. The
consumer will receive the full value of his money to the bank in the form of explicit interest, and
will pay only for those services he 'consumes'. Under the present 'no interest' scheme, the
depositor who writes few checks is subsidizing the depositor who writes many." S. Rep. No. 407,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977).
281. NOW Hearings, supra note 214, at 7 (statement of W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of
the Treasury). Because banking services are "offered below cost or even free, institutions
encourage over-utilization of these services by consumers and add unnecessary expenses to their
operation. . . . [Tlhis misallocation of resources tends to be greater as the banking structure
becomes more competitive. Competition forces firms to be efficient, but if banks are forbidden to
pay interest, competitive pressures forces [sic] them to be inefficient-to offer higher levels of
services At greater discounts from cost .... [The payment of interest on transaction balances] will
reduce or eliminate many of these inequities and inefficiencies .... [Consumers] will also have an
incentive to cut back on wasteful consumption of unneeded services." S. Rep. No. 407, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977).
282. NOW Hearings, supra note 214, at 32-33 (statement of Dr. Arthur F. Burns); S. Rep.
No. 407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977).
283. S. Rep. No. 407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977).
284. 42 Fed. Reg. 11247, 11248 (1977).
285. Id. at 11247.
286. Shick, A History and Overview of Major Economic Aspects and User Concerns,
SHARE DRAFT ACCOUNTS
Moreover, the federal banking agencies could promulgate new regulations
in lieu of the interest prohibition to ensure the security of banks. As in the
case of savings deposits, an interest ceiling could be placed on demand
deposits. 287 Indeed, the original version of the bill which was eventually
enacted as the Glass-Steagall Act contained a provision limiting the rate of
interest on demand deposits to 3 percent. 28 That provision was dropped in
favor of a stronger measure, the interest prohibition section, as a result of the
crisis atmosphere ensuing after the inordinate number of bank failures in early
1933.289 Alternatively, banks could be precluded from investing in certain
types of high-yielding risky investments. This would force banks in their own
self-interest to maintain low interest rates on demand deposits in order to
make those accounts profitable. Finally, service charges could be required.
This would eliminate the possibility that, if left to the banks' discretion, many
of them would refrain from imposing service charges in order to get a
competitive edge over other institutions.
Overall, there are numerous ways of promoting bank security other than by
prohibiting interest payments. While it is not within the scope of this
Comment to compare one method with another, it is submitted that the best
alternative to the interest prohibition method would be the one that provides,
in addition to bank security, maximum freedom of choice for both the
customer in spending his interest and the bank in competing for demand
deposit funds.
V. CONCLUSION
With the advance of Electronic Funds Transfer Systems (EFTS), practices
in the traditionally staid banking community have been undergoing radical
changes in recent years. 290 Designed to take advantage of the technological
achievements in the data processing field, EFTS essentially provides for the
transfer of money held in bank account balances through the use of electronic
devices. 291 For example, automated teller machines now provide bank cus-
tomers with twenty-four hour service. By means of such terminals, customers
can make deposits, withdrawals, and transfer funds between their savings
reprinted in Practicing Law Institute, Electronic Fund Transfers 9, 14 (1977); Electronic Funds
Transfer Systems Seminar, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 3 (Apr. 9, 1976).
287. Congress has delegated the responsibility for setting interest ceilings on savings deposits
to the Federal Reserve Board for all its member banks, see 12 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1976), and to the
FDIC for all nonmember insured banks, see id. § 1828(g).
288. A. Cox, Regulation of Interest Rates on Bank Deposits 21 (1966); see note 233 supra and
accompanying text.
289. A. Cox, Regulation of Interest Rates on Bank Deposits 21-22 (1966); see note 233 supra
and accompanying text.
290. See Brandel & Gresham, Electronic Funds Transfer: The Role of the Federal Gov'ern-
ment, 25 Cath. U.L. Rev. 705, 705 (1976); Ford, Electronic Funds Transfer Systems: The State of
the Art-Present and Projected, 37 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 629, 629-30 (1976).
291. See note 261 supra and accompanying text.
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and checking accounts. 292 Remote-service units (RSU) go one step further by
permitting savings and loan customers to effect these same transactions at a
location remote from the institution, such as in a grocery or department
store. 293 In a banking world marked by these and other EFTS innovations,
share drafts simply become "necessary for the continuing success of credit
unions. "294
Prior to the federal share draft regulation, credit union members were
permitted to withdraw their funds by means of a personal appearance, a
telephone call, or the mail. 295 As has been discussed, however, credit unions
were empowered under the Federal Credit Union Act to authorize other
reasonable methods of share account withdrawal, including the utilization of
share drafts. 296 Nonetheless, federal credit unions did not offer share draft
accounts until they were prodded by the NCUA's regulation prescribing the
requirements for the maintenance of those accounts. 297 In doing so, the
NCUA, by providing credit union members with a "contemporary means of
withdrawing funds" from their share accounts, 298 carried out the con-
gressional mandate that it be responsive to the needs of credit unions and
their members in an evolving economy. 2 9 9
While share drafts are legal under the Federal Credit Union Act, it is
arguable that, as interest-bearing transaction accounts, share drafts provide
credit unions with a competitive advantage over banks, which are prohibited
by federal policy from offering demand deposits upon which interest is
earned. 30 0 Banking practices, however, have successfully circumvented this
prohibition by eroding the distinction between savings accounts and checking
deposits. 30 1 As a result, the competitive inequity between credit unions and
banks is not significant enough to justify the application of this policy to credit
unions. 30 2 Indeed, in view of the circumventions of the policy against
interest-bearing demand deposits so far and the promise that EFTS will
contribute to this trend in the future, the time appears ripe for a reevaluation
of the policy's application to banks. Only then will the capabilities of
electronic technology be fully realized in the banking industry.
Stephen F. Ambrose, Jr.
292. See Ford, Electronic Funds Transfer Systems- The State of the Art-Present and
Projected, 37 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 629, 631 (1976).
293. See note 264 supra and accompanying text.
294. Iowa Credit Union League v. Iowa Dep't of Banking, CE 6-3132, slip op. at 13 (Iowa
Dist. Ct. May 24, 1977).
295. See notes 7, 68 supra and accompanying text.
296. See pt. III supra and accompanying text.
297. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
298. 42 Fed. Reg. 11247, 11247 (1977).
299. Id. at 61978.
300. See notes 246-52 supra and accompanying text.
301. See notes 253-69 supra and accompanying text.
302. See pt. IV(D) supra and accompanying text.
1176
